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INFORMATION SEARCH AND CREATIVITY:
THE ROLE OF NEED FOR COGNITION AND PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
Jody J. lilies, MA
University of Nebraska, 1999
Advisor: Roni Reiter-Palmon, Ph.D.
The effects of type of personal involvement and need for cognition on information
search behaviors and creative problem solving were investigated. It was predicted that
participants who are involved through the personal relevancy of the outcome of a
problem would engage in more information search behaviors and be more creative than
participants who are involved through having their values and morals engaged. It was
also predicted that participants high in need for cognition would engage in more
information search behaviors and would be more creative than would participants low in
need for cognition. Results showed that information search behaviors effectively
predicted creative problem solving. Results also revealed advantages o f high outcome
involvement and detriments of high value involvement. Participants who were asked to
provide a solution to a high outcome-involvement problem engaged in more information
search behaviors and were more creative than participants who were asked to solve either
a high value-involvement problem or a low involvement problem. Participants with high
value involvement engaged in more information search behaviors but wrote solutions that
were even less creative when compared to participants who had a low level of
involvement. The effects of type of personal involvement on creative problem solving

were not mediated by information search behaviors. Participants' need for cognition was
not related to information search behaviors or creativity. Based on the results, it is
suggested that organizations can enhance employee creative problem solving by
providing them with the time and resources needed to engage in information search and
by creating high personal involvement in organizational outcomes. However,
organizations should avoid heavily engaging employees' values and morals because high
value involvement can be detrimental to creative problem solving.
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1

Information Search and Creativity:
The Role of Need for Cognition and Personal Involvement
The Study of Creativity
Less than a half century ago, J. P. Guilford (1950) reported that the empirical
study of creativity was being seriously neglected. This neglect was occurring, Guilford
observed, even though creativity could be measured and a person's creative potential
could be determined. The opportunity to increase creative potential through instruction or
training underscores the importance of researching the creativity construct. Although
research on creativity has increased, Sternberg and Lubart (1996) recently observed that
few resources were being utilized in explaining the creative process in comparison to
other psychological phenomena of the same importance. They stated that creativity
carries the same importance as intelligence due to today's rapidly changing environment
that forces people to cope with novel situations. Ward, Finke, and Smith (1995) also
emphasized that the changing world demands people be able to develop creative solutions
to novel problems as a means of adapting successfully. Thus, the importance of
increasing the general understanding of creativity is very evident, despite its slowly
developing empirical background.
The lack of empirical investigation on creativity can be attributed to two main
issues. Historically, creativity was thought of as only applying to artists, musicians, and
the few others, who, through some "divine intervention," solved a complex problem or
construed some magnificent idea or product (Kneller, 1965; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996).
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In other words, creativity was defined in terms of the “creative” person. For this reason,
research attempted to discover what innate personality characteristics produced this type
of person (Sternberg & Lubart, 1996). Examples of people who fell into this “creative
person” category (e.g., Einstein, Mozart, etc.) were very rare. Despite this, studies
focusing on the characteristics that described these people were done to the exclusion of
looking at the situations in which creativity happened or of looking at the creative process
itself and the outcome of that process (Amabile, 1996). The result was an overall
assumption that creativity did not apply to the average individual.
Recently, a very different view of creativity has emerged. It is now widely
accepted that creativity is distributed throughout the general population (Houtz, 1994;
Treffinger, Isaksen, & Dorval, 1994). Guilford (1950) emphasized that extraordinary
skills are not a requirement for creativity. It is possible for all people to be creative in any
given situation (Runco & Chand, 1994). All people encounter novel situations that can,
and sometimes even must be dealt with creatively (Amabile, 1997; Ward et al., 1995).
Recent research, therefore, is being directed towards demonstrating that creativity can be
recognized (Amabile, 1996) and can be taught (Frederiksen, 1984; Treffinger et al.,
1994). The assumption that creative ability is found and utilized in the general
population, along with the fact that it can be recognized and taught, has been fundamental
to the recent study of creativity. By looking at the creative product and understanding the
processes that lead to that product, along with the personality characteristics of the person
producing that product, researchers are better able to understand and apply creativity in
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the general population.
The complexity of the creativity construct is a second, albeit similar reason why
creativity research has progressed slowly (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Mumford &
Gustafson, 1988). This complexity limited initial attempts at measurement (Amabile,
1996) because each researcher selected his/her own individual aspect of creativity to
operationalize and, consequently, ended up explaining only a small amount of the
variability in creative ability. This resulted in the development of three different
definitions of creativity: (a) those that addressed the creative person, (b) those that
addressed the creative product, and (c) those that addressed the creative process
(Amabile, 1996).
Mumford and Gustafson (1988) responded by suggesting that research on
creativity should not be avoided because of its complexity; it should be studied within
that framework. They emphasized that researchers need to study creativity as a
“syndrome.” Sternberg and Lubart (1996) also found that if creativity is researched as a
multifaceted construct, comprised of factors such as intellectual processes, knowledge,
thinking style, personality, and motivation, a more complex but much more complete
understanding takes form. Thus, the creative person, process, and product should not be
looked at as exclusive ways of defining creativity. Each adds to the explanation of the
creativity construct and, therefore, all need to be explored theoretically and empirically.
This is not to say that individual aspects of creativity should not be studied separately.
Results, however, should be interpreted within this complex framework (Mumford,
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Supinski, Threlfall, & Baughman, 1996).
Defining creativity. Even though research into creativity as a multifaceted
construct has increased, a universally accepted definition has not fully evolved (Amabile,
1996; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988). In 1996, Amabile stated that there still was not
enough known about creativity to have a consistent, accurate definition. Because the
creativity construct is so difficult to operationalize, past definitions were based on how
each researcher subjectively viewed it (Amabile, 1996). However, Amabile insisted
empirical research on creativity should not wait for the development of an agreed upon,
objective definition. Runco and Chand (1994), after reviewing many articles on problem
finding, also emphasized that creative problem solving, as it is found in real-world
situations, can and should be studied empirically, even without a unified definition.
Recently, many researchers have defined creativity in terms of the product
because operational definitions using the product are the most accessible at this time.
Amabile (1996) stated that definitions based on the creative process are not yet “feasible”
and definitions that look at the creative person are still too subjective. Amabile added that
regardless of whether one’s definition looks at the person or the process, s/he must
eventually consider the result in making inferences. A creative product is defined as one
that is both original/novel and appropriate/useful (Amabile, 1996; Feist, 1998; Mumford
& Gustafson, 1988). Also, the path to this product will be ill-defined and heuristic. Thus,
various conditions must be present to make a problem solution creative. At any given
time, problems may be solved in original ways, or in useful ways, or in ill-defined
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situations. Individually, these solutions usually will not be creative. Creative problem
solving will be seen when all three conditions are present in a problem/solution.
The creative process. Even though creativity is usually operationalized using the
creative product, positioning creativity in a theoretical framework necessitates an
understanding of the processes leading to the creative result. The creative process can be
construed as an extension of problem solving (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1962). Usually, a
problem solver posses an extant knowledge base of facts that is applied in solution
generation (Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmon, & Doares, 1991). This is also
true, but not sufficient, for creative problem solving. Creative problem solving also
entails ill-defined problems that require novel solutions (Frederiksen, 1984; Mumford et
al., 1991). Ill-defined problems usually require different cognitive strategies than welldefined problems (Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995). This ill-defined situation should
be thought of as necessary but not sufficient for creative solutions to be generated. Illdefined problems can be, and many times are, solved without the solution being
considered creative.
In addition to ill-defined scenarios, creativity requires both divergent and
convergent thought. These two styles of thinking are required for the combination and
reorganization of existing schemata needed in the early stages of creative problem solving
(Mumford et al., 1991). Divergent and convergent thought also aid in the generation of
solution alternatives and allow for the flexibility needed in evaluating those alternatives
and selecting the best solution. In contrast, traditional problem solving emphasizes
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convergent thought as the person is more likely to satisfice with the first relevant schema
encountered (Mumford et al., 1991). In creative problem solving, the problem solver
searches and reorganizes many schemata in producing many alternative solutions, some
of which will tend to be creative.
Therefore, the creative process usually involves more cognitive activity and
flexibility than the problem-solving process. Mumford, Reiter-Palmon, and Redmond
(1994) stated that one of the cognitive requirements for creative problem solving in illdefined situations is knowledge in the form of extant, “organized” schemata. These extant
schemata are manipulated in different ways in an effort to develop alternative solutions to
novel problems (Mumford et al., 1994). Therefore, the creative process must involve a
search of existing schemata or, if a possible matching schema is not found, a search for
information that will aid in the development of new problem schemata. Second, this
process must also include the cognitive combination and reorganization o f these extant or
developed knowledge categories in ways that will facilitate generating solutions to illdefined problems (Baughman & Mumford, 1995; Mobley, Doares, & Mumford, 1992;
Mumford et al., 1991).
Thus, the creative problem solver cannot just apply extant knowledge, but must
cognitively manipulate this knowledge in new and appropriate ways. In an effort to
understand how cognition plays a role in creative problem solving, many researchers
have developed models of creativity using a cognitive-processes foundation. These
cognitive models attempt to understand the core processes involved in creative thought
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and the types o f mental representations that are utilized in creative problem solving
(Mumford et al., 1991; Sternberg & Lubart, 1996).
Many cognitive-process models have been developed over the years, differing in
the nature of processing (conscious versus unconscious) and number o f core processes
involved. Recently, Mumford et al. (1991) reviewed these creativity models and, based
on them, developed a more comprehensive analytic model o f their own (see Figure 1).
According to the relationships among the core processes of creative thought suggested by
this model, if an appropriate or satisfactory solution is not found, the problem solver may
return to any earlier stage. However, Mumford et al. proposed that people usually return
to the stage directly preceding the current stage. The model also clearly displays the
importance of both convergent and divergent thought. The creative person must not only
use divergent thinking in developing new ways to construe and structure a problem but
must also use convergent thinking in selecting the most relevant information and in
deciding on the best method to be used in generating solutions (Mumford et al., 1991).
Finally, and maybe most importantly for creative problem solving, Mumford et al.
(1991) emphasized with their model that the success of the creative process depends
heavily upon the first couple of stages, primarily on the problem construction stage and
the information encoding stage. They alleged that these early stages might be the decisive
factor in transforming traditional problem solving into creative problem solving.
Research has shown that problem finding requires different skills than those used in
traditional problem solving (Smilansky, 1984; Wakefield, 1992). These skills, which aid
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Figure 1
Hypothesized relationships among the core creative processes
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M. D. Mumford, M. I. Mobley, C. E. Uhlman, R. Reiter-Palmon,
and L. M. Doares, 1991, Creativity Research Journal, 4, p. 106.
Reprinted with pemiission.
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in the discovery and construction of problems, are essential to creative performance
(Wakefield, 1985). Mumford et al. (1994) emphasized that the problem construction stage
lays the groundwork on which the remaining creative problem-solving stages are based.
In support of this contention and the model as a whole, Mumford, Supinski, Baughman,
Costanza, and Threlfall (1997) found that problem construction, information encoding,
category selection, and category combination processes are all effective predictors of
creative performance above and beyond divergent-thinking ability and verbal-reasoning
ability.
Information Search and Creativity
Mumford et al. (1991) reported that the information search process, followed by
the information encoding process, needs to be understood because errors made in these
early processes influence the later stages of the creative problem solving. Information
search behaviors are incorporated heavily in the early stages of the creative process and
have been reported as essential in those ill-defined domains that require creative thought
(Frederiksen, 1984). Searching for and encoding faulty or irrelevant information will be
detrimental to effective solution development. Smith (1989), for example, found that
errors in problem representations caused by faulty information search and interpretation
resulted in deficient problem solving. The study of the information search process, then,
is essential to the understanding of creative problem solving.
Guilford (1950) noted that creative individuals have the ability to produce many
ideas on a given topic. Accordingly, a high degree of information search is required for
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the development of creative solutions. It was mentioned above that information search is
important early in the creative process. Therefore, this search process should affect the
early stages of the Mumford et al. (1991) process analytic model. Although beyond the
scope of this study, it is speculated that information search behaviors have a large impact
during the transition from the problem construction stage to the information encoding
stage. Each of these stages will be discussed briefly to illustrate this theory.
Problem construction. Problem construction is one of the most important
processes in delineating creativity from traditional problem solving (Mumford et al.,
1991). Mumford et al. (1994) defined problem construction as the "plan for process
execution serving to structure and direct the problem-solving effort" (p. 6). Runco and
Chand (1994) discussed that a very similar process, problem finding, is critical in the
solving of real-world problems occurring in natural environments. Tegano, Sawyers, and
Moran (1989) reported that the best point in which to develop creative problem solving is
in the problem finding stage.
Empirically, in the now well-known longitudinal study of problem finding in
artists, Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi (1976) found that problem finding was not only
predictive of creativity in current situations, but was also predictive of productivity and
originality later in life. In a more recent study, Redmond, Mumford, and Teach (1993)
found that people who engaged in problem-construction activities spent more time
solving problems and produced higher quality and more original solutions. Similarly,
Reiter-Palmon, Mumford, and Threlfall (1998) found that not only did problem
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construction affect solution quality and originality directly, but that individuals with high
problem-construction ability defined and constructed problems in ways that were familiar
to them, which in turn also positively affected solution quality and originality.
Many empirical studies have demonstrated that problem construction is essential
in defining the information that will be needed in continuing the creative process.
Without engaging in problem construction, most problem solvers satisfice with the first
relevant problem schema encountered and do not search for the additional information
that will make the solution creative (Mumford et al. 1994). Thus, problem-construction
ability allows people to recognize alternative plans that may be used to represent and
solve a problem.
Mumford et al. (1994) reported that during problem construction a person
activates or creates a problem representation that structures the problem and serves as a
guide for the remaining stages of the creative process. Most immediately, this
representation identifies the information needed in generating solutions to the problem
(Mumford, Baughman, Costanza, Uhlman, & Connelly, 1993). Thus, it will guide the
information search behaviors of the problem solver. Once a person structures a problem,
they will have a better idea of the information they need to search for, either form long
term memory or from external means.
In summary, problem construction lays the foundation for the information search
process in creative problem solving (Mumford et al., 1993). Problem construction shapes
the creative-process plan and sets the stage for the second process, information encoding.
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The problem representation and solution-development plan, identified through the
problem construction process, guide the information search process, which in turn,
identifies the pertinent information to encode (Mumford et al., 1993; Mumford et al.,
1991).
Information encoding. Once a person has searched and retrieved the information
needed to generate solutions to a problem, s/he will need to encode that information in a
manner that will facilitate the solving of the problem. This encoding process is the second
stage of the Mumford et al. (1991) model. As discussed earlier, when solving a novel
problem based on the problem representation developed through problem construction, an
individual will need both extant and new knowledge. Extant knowledge will be gathered
by searching and retrieving relevant information from long-term memory. Non-existing
knowledge will be gathered by analyzing given or found information and deciding on the
relevance of this information to the given problem; this process is sometimes referred to
as information use. The relevant information from both sources will then be encoded into
the current problem schemata under the framework o f the problem representation.
In an empirical study o f the role o f information use in creativity, Reiter-Palmon,
Mumford, O'Connor Boes, and Runco (1997) demonstrated that information use will
have a positive affect on creative problem solving. In this study, participants were given
consistent or inconsistent cues to a novel, real-world problem. Inconsistent cues were
incongruous with the other information in the problem. After participants solved the
problem, Reiter-Palmon et al. looked at whether or not participants were able to use the
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discrepant cues in their solutions. Results showed that those participants who were high
in problem construction ability used the inconsistent cues and were more creative as a
result..
Similarly, it has been found that the retrieval and/or use of a larger scope of
information by engaging in extended information search has a positive effect on creativity
(Finke et al., 1992). Emphasizing this idea, Mumford, Baughman, Supinski, and Maher
(1996) stated that the type of information people search for and encode when faced with a
novel, real-world problem will lay the foundation for the creative process. They found
that the time spent on information encoding predicted creative performance. Thus, the
more information one searches for and retrieves, the more information there is to encode,
and the more information that will be available for the later stages of the creative process.
Conclusions regarding information search and creativity. Information search is
fundamental to the creative process and is speculated to have the greatest impact between
the problem construction and information encoding stages of the Mumford et al. (1991)
process analytic model. Once a problem is constructed and a unified problem
representation is identified, the next step is to search for relevant information based on
the problem representation. This information search will be both internal and external.
Next, the resultant information will be encoded in a manner that facilitates solution
generation.
Thus, information search will have a major impact during the rest of the creative
process. Finding a creative solution will be facilitated if a person has a wide range of
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information encoded on an issue, which will be dependent upon the amount of time spent
searching for information and the amount and quality of information generated from that
search.
Mumford, Baughman, Supinski, et al. (1996) hypothesized that there are
fundamental differences between people in the type of information searched for when
encountering an ill-defined problem. It follows that this individual difference will have a
considerable effect on creativity. Mumford, Baughman, Threlfall, Supinski, and Costanza
(1996), for example, found that information search activities centered on high quality and
appropriate aspects of a chosen problem representation may be more influential in
creative problem solving than just a search of original elements. This study demonstrated
that determining what influences information search and encoding behaviors in
individuals will increase the understanding of the creative process as a whole. The present
study will address further the effect of information search on creativity. Hypothesis one
addresses the first part of this issue.

Hypothesis 1: Given an open-ended, real-world problem, increases in problem-related
information search behaviors will be accompanied by increases in the creativity of the
solutions generated for that problem.

Information search is essential for creative problem solving in ill-defined
domains. Also, people differ in information search strategies and effectiveness
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(Mumford, Baughman, Supinski, et al., 1996). Therefore, determining the characteristics
of the person, problem, and/or situation that facilitate or hinder information search will
further the understanding of the creativity construct. Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly (1996)
reported that there are individual differences and situational differences that affect a
person's motivation to process information. Similarly, Amabile (1996) and Feist (1998)
discussed that there are two areas of research that address factors affecting creativity:
individual differences and social/situational aspects. This study addresses one variable in
each domain. Need for cognition was examined as an individual-difference variable and
personal involvement was considered as a social/situational variable.
Need for Cognition
Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe (1955) reported that people have a need to understand
what is happening around them. They labeled this characteristic the need for cognition.
People differ in the strength of this need (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), and it would seem
that those who have a high need for cognition would have a tendency to spend more time
in the early stages of the creative process. The early stages are when an attempt is made
to understand and structure a problem through problem construction, information search,
and information encoding.
Elaborating on the construct identified by Cohen et al. (1955), Cacioppo and Petty
(1982) proposed that the need for cognition was a stable individual difference. They
defined this difference as a need to engage in and enjoy thinking. People high in need for
cognition are more inclined to organize and elaborate on information and are motivated
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by intrinsic motivation (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Cacioppo et al.
(1996) reported that people who are high in need for cognition also enjoy thinking about
and reflecting on information rather than using heuristics or social comparisons. As a
result, they suggested that people high in need for cognition have more information
available to them on a wider range of topics. Because of this, they will engage in a more
active information search (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Research has tended to support the need for cognition as a stable individual
difference (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris (1983) found that
participants who were high in need for cognition reported exerting more cognitive effort
and were more affected or persuaded by strong arguments on an issue. Participants in this
study were given either strong arguments in favor of comprehensive exams or tuition
increases being implemented at their school or given weak arguments for these changes.
Participants high in need for cognition tended to be persuaded by the strong arguments
(unlike those low in need for cognition) even though the outcomes were aversive in
nature. This indicated that people high in need for cognition were willing to consider and
think about the information given to them to the extent that they were persuaded by
strong arguments contrary to their existing attitude.
To further the explanation of the need for cognition construct, Cacioppo, Petty,
Kao, and Rodriguez (1986) incorporated it into the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1984). According to this model, there are two routes that one can
follow when processing information. One is a peripheral route where little effort is
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afforded to information processing. The second is a central route where the person
diligently looks at the information with his/her full attention. Using the ELM framework,
individuals who are low in need for cognition can be thought o f as processing
information along the peripheral route whereas those high in need for cognition will
follow the central route (Cacioppo et al., 1986).
Cacioppo et al. (1986) found support for this relationship by demonstrating that
people high in need for cognition were more likely to process and consider strong
arguments. Specifically, they found that participants high in need for cognition thought
more about the 1984 presidential election and were more knowledgeable about this
election than those low in need for cognition, indicating use of the central route by those
high in need for cognition. In a very similar study, Condra (1992) found that participants
high in need for cognition were more involved in politics, talked politics more often, and
were more interested in the 1988 presidential debates.
Many similar studies have explored the need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1996),
all helping to advance the understanding of the construct. For example, Verplanken
(1989) found that need for cognition moderated the attitude-behavior relation.
Participants who were high in need for cognition were more likely to behave in a manner
consistent with their attitude than those low in need for cognition. In a similar study to
those conducted by Cacioppo et al. (1986) and Condra (1992), Ahlering (1987) found that
people high in need for cognition were more likely to report the intent to watch the 1984
presidential debates.
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Other studies have shown that the need for cognition is positively but moderately
related to attributional complexity (r = .36, Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, &
Reeder, 1986), intrinsic motivation (r = .69, Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994)
and self-esteem (r = .42, Osberg, 1987). Need for cognition has also been shown to be
negatively related to dogmatism (r = -.24, Fletcher et al., 1986), cognitive closure (r = .28, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), extrinsic motivation (r = -.27, Amabile et al., 1994),
ambivalence (r = -.41 & -.33, Thompson & Zanna, 1995) and social anxiety (r = -.28 & .30, Osberg, 1987). Need for cognition has also been shown to have small to moderate
correlations with intelligence (r = -.03 with abstract reasoning, Cacioppo et al., 1983; r =
.32 & .15 with verbal reasoning, Cacioppo et al., 1986 and Cacioppo et al. 1983,
respectively). All o f these studies have increased the discriminant validity o f the need for
cognition construct.
Cacioppo et al. (1996) discussed that people high in need for cognition engage in
more information processing, have the ability to recall more information, and have more
information accessible to them. These characteristics imply that people high in need for
cognition would also engage in more information search behaviors and, thus, be more
effective problem solvers. Less research exists on the effect o f need for cognition on
actual information search and problem solving. However, the empirical evidence that
does exist indicates that the need for cognition positively influences information search
behaviors.
One such study by Verplanken, Hazenberg, and Palenewen (1992) found that
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when evaluating a product based on information that could be acquired, people with a
high need for cognition desired more information and used more cognitive effort than
people low in need for cognition. However, participants in this study did not actually
search for information, they simply indicated what information they would desire if in
that situation. In a follow-up study, Verplanken (1993) refined these results by actually
allowing participants to search and screen information. Results again revealed that
participants with a high need for cognition engaged in more cognitive effort, which was
measured by the total number of information-relevant responses - those responses that
related to the alternatives or dimensions being searched. However, contrary to indications
from the Verplanken et al. (1992) results, participants high in need for cognition did not
actually search for more information than people low in need for cognition. Verplanken
speculated that two factors might have caused these results. First, it is possible that
simply identifying the information one desires to see utilizes somewhat different
processes than actually searching for that information. If so, the processes used in
actually searching for information may not be related to the need for cognition. Secondly,
Verplanken used an information-display board, which may have resulted in a ceiling
effect for amount of information searched. Because there was only a limited amount of
information on the display board, there may not have been sufficient variability to see an
effect of need for cognition on amount searched.
Scudder, Herschel, and Crossland (1994), using the Lost at Sea Task, found a
correlation of .44 between need for cognition and idea generation (this task requires
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participants to assess 15 different survival items given the scenario they are shipwrecked
in the South Pacific, Nemiroff & Pasmore, 1975). This study indicated that people high in
need for cognition searched and retrieved more information. Sadowski and Gulgoz (1996)
encountered similar results. They found that participants who were high in need for
cognition were more likely to have an elaborative-processing orientation. Along the same
lines, Chang and McDaniel (1995) reported that high need for cognition was related to
more directed information search strategies.
These studies all suggest to some degree that people high in need for cognition are
adept at searching for information, and/or have a greater motivation to do so. Therefore,
the second hypothesis of this study is designed to further discern the effect of need for
cognition on information search behaviors.

Hypothesis 2: People high in need for cognition will engage in more information search
behaviors than will those low in need for cognition.

Based on the effect of information search in the creative process, hypothesis three
was formulated to study the effects of need for cognition on creativity. Mumford et al.
(1994) speculated that if a person is not given a reason to engage in problem construction,
they will satisfice with the first problem representation encountered. Without problem
construction, a person will not engage in laborious information search, negatively
affecting the resultant creativity. Thus, if a person is motivated to engage in problem
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construction and not satisfice, they should search for more information, which should
result in higher creativity. People who are high in need for cognition are hypothesized to
have this motivation.
This reasoning is consistent with Heppner, Reeder, and Larson (1983) who found
that people who were more confident in problem solving and approached problems were
also higher in need for cognition. Scudder et al. (1994) also found that need for cognition
was correlated with idea generation, which, in turn, was correlated with the quality of
problem solutions (r = .44 & .49, respectively). Although both studies indicated that need
for cognition affects problem solving, an alternative explanation might be that this effect
was due to experience with problem solving rather than high need for cognition. This
issue touches on the debate between the trait model and situational model of personality
(Magnusson & Endler, 1977). This disputation is best addressed using the interactionist
perspective (Magnusson & Endler, 1977). This perspective suggests that an individual
will actively select the environment or situation entered (Magnusson & Endler, 1977).
Both environmental characteristics and personality characteristics will affect an
individual's behavior in this situation. Also, not only will the environment affect and
change the individual, but the individual will affect and change the environment (Buss,
1987).
Therefore, one's experience with problem solving may make him/her more likely
to be better or more effective at generating solutions to problems and may also result in
him/her developing a higher need for cognition. However, an individual high in need for
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cognition has a personality that will influence him/her to seek out problem solving
situations throughout his/her development, and which will increase his/her problem
solving experience. Showing an empirical distinction between the two (or determining
which is more powerful) will be impossible in the design of the present study. In any
case, people do differ in the need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1996), and the present
study only predicts that this difference will present itself in the creativity o f solutions to
presented, ill-defined problems. Exactly how a high need for cognition is developed is not
addressed by this study.
Specifically, it is predicted that need for cognition will affect the creativity of
solutions directly and will also have a mediating effect through information search. It was
discussed above that need for cognition may affect creativity through problem
construction. Problem construction, however, will not only increase information search
(Mumford et al., 1994) but will also lay a plan for the whole creative process. Also,
Verplanken (1993) speculated that people high in need for cognition utilize more
cognitive effort but that this effort may not display itself completely in the amount of
information searched. Thus, this cognitive effort may show up in other creative processes.
Thus, the effect of need for cognition on creativity may be only partially mediated by
information search behaviors. Hypothesis three addresses this issue.

Hypothesis 3: People high in need for cognition will produce more creative solutions to
ill-defined problems than will those low in need for cognition. This effect will be partially
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mediated by information search behaviors.

Personal Involvement
A second factor that may have an impact on information search is a person's
motivation due to his/her involvement with a topic, decision, or problem. Personal
involvement is commonly defined as how personally relevant an issue is to a person
(Zaichkowsky, 1986). More specifically, Johnson and Eagly (1989) define involvement
as “the motivational state induced by an association between an activated attitude and
some aspect o f the self-concept” (p. 293). Involvement has been discussed as a means to
increase the amount o f thinking, or control the amount o f thinking a person engages in
(Chaiken et al., 1996). Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann (1983) reported that people
process information more deeply and pay more attention to information when personally
involved. Similarly, Runco, Nemiro, and Walberg (1998), after surveying creativity
researchers, found that most students o f creativity believe that motivation, o f any sort, is
essential for creative achievement.
Much o f the research on personal involvement has centered on its effect on
persuasion (Johnson & Eagly, 1989) and advertisement (Zaichkowsky, 1986) with little
emphasis on the effect o f involvement on decision-making and related areas (Takemura,
1994). However, it has been reported that the attributes of a problem or task play a large
role in determining the amount and type of thought directed at a problem or task (Brophy,
1998). Thus, a problem that, due to its nature, produces a high level o f involvement
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should have positive effects on the creativity of the solutions to that problem. Ruscio,
Whitney, and Amabile (1998) alleged that intrinsic motivation affects creativity due to an
increased level of task involvement. Their research results supported this assertion by
showing that involvement was significantly related to creativity in three different tasks
(structure-building, collage-making, and poem-writing). Although involvement was not
manipulated, these results indicate that increasing a person's involvement in a task will
positively affect creativity.
In a study conducted by Takemura (1994), which directly manipulated
involvement, participants were asked to select a dating partner based on different personal
attributes. Information on these attributes could be acquired for each of the possible
candidates. Involvement was manipulated by informing the participants in the high
involvement condition that they would be given the opportunity to meet the person they
selected. Participants in the low involvement condition were not told of this opportunity.
Results revealed that the involved participants spent more time engaging in information
search. Similarly, Atoum and Farah (1993) found that groups of participants with high
involvement in a task generated more ideas. Participants in this study generated ideas on
why they were against comprehensive examinations being required for graduation from
college. High involvement was obtained by telling participants a comprehensive exam
was being considered for implementation at their school.
The study by Takemura (1994) and the study by Atoum and Farah (1993)
demonstrated that high involvement motivates people to engage in more information
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search behaviors. They both also, however, manipulated personal involvement by making
the outcome o f the decision task affect the participants personally (high involvement) or
have no immediate effect on them (low involvement). This distinction is meaningful
because Johnson and Eagly (1989) reported that the type o f involvement studied can have
an impact on the effect it produces. They made a distinction between value involvement
and outcome involvement.
Involvement that is value-relevant was described as affecting attitudes through
involving the self-concept or ego (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). This type o f issue strongly
affects aspects o f a person's well-established internal values and morals. Johnson and
Eagly (1989) reported that most empirical studies o f value involvement occurred before
1975, when the operationalization o f involvement was influenced by the dominance of
social-judgment issues in the research o f that time. Value involvement was seen as
producing close-mindedness and resistance to persuasion (Johnson & Eagly, 1990).
Value-involvement research will be discussed in more detail later.
Recently, involvement research has focused on another type of involvement,
outcome involvement (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). High involvement in this research is
usually achieved by giving participants the possibility (through their decisions) to achieve
or avoid a personally relevant outcome or goal. Johnson (1994) equates the terms issue
involvement and personal relevance with outcome involvement and reports that this
research manipulates involvement by making important outcomes salient to highly
involved participants. For example, having participants believe that the school program
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they are discussing might be implemented at their school (high involvement) or a
different school (low involvement) (Atoum & Farah, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a,
1979b, 1984), or told they will be given the opportunity to meet a selected dating partner
(high involvement) or not meet him/her (low involvement) (Takemura, 1994). Both of
these manipulations involve participants by allowing them to believe the outcome of their
effort is relevant to them because the consequences will affect them in some way. Neither
manipulation engages internal values or morals.
A meta-analysis performed by Johnson and Eagly (1989) found that value
involvement and outcome involvement produce different effects because they engage
different aspects of the self. Value involvement affects the self s values and morals and
outcome involvement affects the self s ability to attain or avoid some outcome. Johnson
and Eagly's meta-analysis found that value involvement inhibits attitude change with both
high involvement and low involvement, with the inhibitory effect of high involvement
being stronger than that of low involvement. Outcome involvement, however, interacts
with argument strength in affecting persuasion. High outcome involvement produced
more persuasion than low outcome involvement with strong arguments but not with weak
arguments. Johnson and Eagly concluded that outcome involvement and value
involvement are in fact different constructs and, therefore, produce different effects.
Petty and Cacioppo (1990) countered Johnson and Eagly's (1989) conclusions by
emphasizing that degree of persuasion simply centers on whether or not someone is
personally involved. The type of involvement is irrelevant. They put involvement on a
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continuum where the more involved one is, value or outcome, the more s/he is motivated
to actively process information. Thus, high involvement simply increases unbiased
information processing. They suggested that people who have high value involvement
activate more attitudes and consistent knowledge when that value-relevant issue is
encountered. Thus, value involvement is just a higher level of involvement, not a
different construct. They also point out that any inhibiting effect o f value involvement is
probably due to biased processing brought on by this higher level of knowledge on the
value issue or by a stronger preexisting attitude, not because of the type of involvement.
They reported these aspects as possible confounds that could explain the value
involvement results without prescribing a different involvement construct.
This reasoning was almost contradictory to what Petty and Cacioppo had
previously reported. At one point, Petty and Cacioppo (1979b) suggested that
involvement associated with one's values may be such a high level of involvement that
processing stops in the “interest of self-protection” (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b, p. 1924).
Although this already hinted towards their current position o f an involvement continuum,
they did seem to suggest that something different happens when one's values are
involved. Different involvement constructs may be the explanation. Value involvement
seems to have an inhibiting effect by addressing a different aspect of the self than
outcome involvement. Value involvement affects one’s values whereas outcome
involvement affects one’s concern about the ability to avoid or attain an outcome that is
personally and temporally relevant (Johnson and Eagly, 1989). Both Johnson and Eagly
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and Petty and Cacioppo agreed, however, that additional empirical evidence is needed to
help discern the difference, or lack thereof, between the types of involvement. Similar to
Johnson and Eagly (1989), this study considers value and outcome involvement to be
different theoretical constructs. Each will be briefly discussed to support this assertion.
Value involvement. Value-involvement research had its beginning in the socialjudgment/ego-involvement research of Sherif and his colleagues (Johnson & Eagly,
1989). Sherif and Cantril (1947) theorized that attitudes that affect a person’s social
norms and values have the biggest impact and, thus, are the most important, on a day-today basis. They reported that these attitudes develop in a person as they repeatedly react
in a consistent manner to certain social situations. These attitudinal reactions are
“judgment activities” and these “social value judgments reveal themselves in the
psychology of the individual as established attitudes” (Sherif & Cantril, 1947, p. 29).
These social attitudes, developed over time, are based on one’s personal values and
become ingrained in that person. Thus, they will be very influential whenever that person
is involved in a situation that activates that attitude.
Sherif and Cantril (1947) went on to discuss that value-based attitudes, (e.g.,
attitudes on religion, race, etc.) are ego-involved and have societal significance to a
person making them very “enduring.” “They become major constituents of the ego”
(Sherif & Cantril, 1947, p. 61). The person begins to identify with these attitudes. This
identification, Sherif and Cantril reported, greatly influences the person’s social behavior.
Sherif and Cantril discussed that the degree to which a person identifies with an attitude
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and the intensity of that attitude are determined by that attitude's level of egoinvolvement. Thus, these ego-involved attitudes will become part o f one's self-concept
and will dictate how frustrated the person becomes when these attitudes are attacked
(Sherif & Cantril, 1947).
Sherif and his colleagues used this social-judgment/ego-involvement basis in their
research on attitude change (Sherif, Sherif, & Neberball, 1965). They theorized that if an
ego-involved attitude produces frustration when opposed, attempts to persuade a person
to change that attitude should be very difficult. Research on attitude change in this arena
has used issues such as politics, religion, and race to produce ego-involvement. These
issues are usually associated with one’s values and social attitudes and therefore, usually
produce motivational and emotional reactions (Sherif et al., 1965).
Sherif et al. (1965) asserted that when a person takes a stand on an issue, either
positive or negative, a judgment is involved. The attitudes on the issue that is being
judged will bring to mind well-established ideas on the issue and will determine whether
or not the situation is acceptable. More specifically, Sherif et al. explained that a person
has a latitude of rejection and a latitude of acceptance with regards to social issues. The
width o f these latitudes on any given issue determines whether it is acceptable or not;
anything falling within the latitude of rejection is renounced, and anything within the
latitude of acceptance is endorsed. Sherif et al. stated that heightened personal
involvement leads to a greater latitude of rejection. Recall that the level of involvement in
this research depended heavily upon the degree to which the attitude involved reflected
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the values that comprised the person’s “self-picture” (Sherif et al. 1965).
Sherif et al. (1965) discussed that the acceptance or rejection o f an issue is
categorical in nature. Also, if a person is not involved in an issue, then the prestige of the
communication or communicator can make a difference in attitude change (an idea that
would be advanced later by Petty and Cacioppo (1984) with their Elaboration Likelihood
Model). Thus, in the case of low involvement, a person’s latitude of rejection would not
be as large, and s/he could be persuaded by peripheral cues. Sherif et al. discussed a
proportional relationship between level of attitudinal involvement and latitudes of
rejection or acceptance. A person's major attitudes are ego-related and the more these
attitudes are involved, the higher one’s latitude o f rejection will be for counter-attitudinal
messages, and the larger one’s latitude of acceptance will be for attitude-consistent
messages.
Sherif et al. (1965) performed empirical studies that considered ego-involvement
by selecting participants based on specific beliefs in some cause. These participants were
then given tasks related to that cause or issue. Another manipulation involved giving
participants instructions that informed them their performance on the given task would be
included on college records or were told that this performance would indicate some
personal attribute to the experimenter (Sherif et al., 1965). Results o f both these types of
studies found resistance to attitude change under high ego-involvement.
Ostrom and Brock (1968) further clarified Sherif s idea of ego-involvement and
how it related to persuasion. They discussed ego-involvement as a determinant of how
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much persuasion will occur. The higher the involvement the more resistant one is to
change a related value-laden attitude. They agreed with Sherif et al. (1965) that
involvement is greater when an activated attitude is based on one’s values. They also
predicted that the more values activated at any given time the greater the involvement.
Ostrom and Brock argued that high ego-involved attitudes are “well embedded in the
cognitive structure” (p. 375), and altering this attitude would have to include extensive
cognitive restructuring. Because people desire cognitive consistency, this restructuring is
very aversive and produces a large resistant to persuasion (Ostrom & Brock, 1968).
Ostrom and Brock (1968) mentioned that many ego-involvement experiments
required participants to take a stand on some social value-relevant issue. Researchers
would first measure participants' attitude on that issue, then present them with counter
communication on the issue and, finally, measure their attitude again, thereby looking at
attitude change. One such study had participants read a short story on why some fictitious
person should not be allowed admittance to a bank (the result would be a financial loss to
the bank) (Ostrom & Brock, 1968). The participants then went through a “bonding”
exercise where they would link statements based on the story to a list of personal values.
This list of values either included central values (e.g., keeping promises) or peripheral
values (e.g., importance o f paying taxes). The participants then heard a discrepant
message that advocated this fictitious person being allowed into the bank. The dependent
measure was attitude towards this person being admitted to the bank. Results were similar
to those found by Sherif et al. (1965) in that those participants with activated peripheral
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values changed their attitude in accordance with the counter-attitudinal message whereas
those having their central values connected were undeterred by the discrepant message.
Both the discussion by Sherif et al. (1965) and Ostrom and Brock (1968)
addressed the value-involvement effect alluded to by Johnson and Eagly (1989). Both
asserted that value involvement taps a person’s central, well-established values leading to
close-mindedness and decreased persuasion to counter-attitudinal messages. Valueinvolved participants hold fast to their position and are unwilling to alter their stance. In a
more recent study by Johnson, Lin, Symons, Campbell, and Ekstein (1995), it was shown
again that wide latitudes of rejection produce resistance to persuasion. Participants in this
study were asked to read a story on the desirability of mandatory AIDS testing. They
were then given 2.5 minutes to list all the characteristics and facts they could on the issue.
The items on this list were then rated to determine whether the participant generated
beliefs for or against AIDS testing. Johnson et al. then used opinion statements to
measure each participant’s latitude o f rejection. A week later participants were called
back and given a book containing arguments counter to their beliefs on mandatory AIDS
testing.
Results showed that participants who retrieved more beliefs were more persuaded
by strong counter-arguments than weak arguments. This held when initial beliefs were
positive or negative. However, results also showed that if participants initially had
negative beliefs on the issue and had large latitudes of rejection, they were not persuaded
by the counter-arguments. Johnson et. al. (1995) discussed that their measure of latitude
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of rejection indicated a form of personal value-relevance similar to the value-involvement
distinction that was discussed in Johnson and Eagly’s (1989) meta-analysis. Results
showing inhibited persuasion with large latitudes of rejection were similar to those
discussed by Sherif et al. (1965).
Summary of value involvement. Johnson and Eagly (1989) contended that value
involvement should be considered a distinct type o f involvement. High value
involvement results from the activation o f value-laden attitudes. These attitudes have
been firmly established in a person and are “constituents of his self-picture” (Sherif et al.,
1965). Because of this, a person with these attitudes activated will be close-minded and
will be resistant to persuasion attempts directed at changing the attitude. Research has
tended to support this assertion (Greenwald, 1982; Ostrom & Brock, 1968; Sherif et al.,
1965).
There is one distinction within value-involvement research that should be
addressed further. This issue concerns the manipulation o f value involvement and
whether or not the issue addressed in the manipulation affects the self directly or
indirectly. Petty and Cacioppo (1990) point out that the most involving issues will be
those that involve the self. This distinction would hold true if the involvement were
outcome- or value-relevant. A concern that has not been investigated adequately is the
impact of affecting the self directly or indirectly when value involvement is manipulated.
Freedman (1964) manipulated involvement by telling participants in the high
involvement condition that responses they would give on administered scales would
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indicate to the experimenter their intelligence and personality. This manipulation (typical
of that with ego-involvement research) affected the self directly and resulted in a decrease
in the amount of discrepancy the participants needed to reject the persuasion attempt. On
the other hand, Johnson et al. (1995) engaged participants' values by affecting the self
indirectly. As described above, participants in this study had to generate beliefs on the
AIDS issue. Results demonstrated that participants with wide latitudes of rejection on the
issue of mandatory AIDS testing were more resistant to persuasion. Whether or not
engaging a person's values by getting him/her involved directly or indirectly will produce
different results remains to be seen and is beyond the scope of this study. However, based
on the above research, it would seem that similar results would be found.
Outcome involvement. Johnson and Eagly (1989) reported that after 1975 a
second form of involvement research surfaced, outcome-relevant involvement. Johnson
and Eagly discussed that this research produced personal involvement by making an
outcome salient to participants (Johnson, 1994). Most of this research was performed by
Petty and Cacioppo and their colleagues during the late 1970’s and throughout the
1980’s. Results consistently revealed that level of involvement interacted with argument
strength in affecting attitudes and persuasion. Some of this research will be discussed
below.
Petty and Cacioppo (1979a) hypothesized that personal involvement would
motivate people to increase their level of processing. This increased level of processing
should make highly involved participants more open to strong, counter-attitudinal
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messages. To test this assertion, Petty and Cacioppo manipulated involvement by making
an outcome either directly or indirectly relevant to their undergraduate participants. The
high involvement group was told that their university was discussing a plan to install
comprehensive exams as a requirement for graduation. The low involvement group was
told that this comprehensive examination would not be installed until after they graduated
and another low involvement group was told that this comprehensive exam was being
considered for a different school. A second independent variable was whether or not the
participants were informed that an attempt was going to be made to persuade them.
Results confirmed the predictions. If participants were forewarned o f persuasive
intent, resistance to attitude change occurred. This effect was most pronounced in the
high involvement group. If there was no forewarning o f persuasive intent, highly
involved participants demonstrated more attitude change than low involved participants.
It was speculated that this effect was due to the increased processing by the highly
involved participants. These participants were willing to look more critically at the
arguments supporting comprehensive exams at their school. If participants were
forewarned they seemed to be less objective. One possible alternative explanation for this
is that forewarning participants brought in a value involvement type o f manipulation.
Telling someone that one is going to attempt to change his/her opinion may produce a
defensive reaction in him/her similar to that encountered with value-involvement. This
reaction likely would not happen if the person was unaware that an attempt was being
made to persuade them.
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In a similar study, Petty and Cacioppo (1979b) discussed that the type of
involvement they were considering concerned the extent to which an issue under
consideration was important to the participant. They reported that the type o f involvement
used in their studies was similar to that discussed by Sherif et al. (1965) (Johnson &
Eagly (1989) disagreed). Experiment one in this study showed that high involvement
produced pro-attitudinal persuasion but decreased counter-attitudinal persuasion. The
pro-attitudinal message advocated more leniency to coed visitation hours in campus
dorms and the counter-attitudinal message advocated more strict visitation hours.
Involvement was manipulated by telling participants in the high involvement condition
that this issue was being discussed at their school. Participants in the low involvement
condition were told this issue was being considered at a different school. The result of
this study was consistent with social judgment research. Highly involved participants
changed their attitudes less.
Experiment two by Petty and Cacioppo (1979b) was similar except that the issue
was changed and quality of arguments was added as an independent variable. The issue
used was identical to the one they used before, the comprehensive examination issue.
Argument quality was discussed as a modification of the social-judgment research.
Specifically, if Petty & Cacioppo were correct in hypothesizing that high involvement
increased motivation to think about an issue then participants should be persuaded by
strong arguments; these participants will rationally consider the arguments. Petty and
Cacioppo speculated that social-judgment theory, however, would predict decreased
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persuasion under low and high involvement. Results supported their (Petty & Cacioppo's)
hypothesis and not the social-judgment hypothesis. High involvement increased
persuasion when strong arguments were given but decreased persuasion when weak
arguments were given. Petty and Cacioppo reported that the results o f this experiment
contradicted social-judgment theory. However, the involvement manipulation in this
study was now purely outcome-relevant.
Petty and Cacioppo (1984) then took the results they were finding with
involvement and incorporated them in the ELM. Recall from the need for cognition
discussion that according to this model, there are two routes that one can take when
processing a message. One is the peripheral route where not much effort is put into
information processing. The second is the central route where the person diligently looks
at the content of a message with their full attention. Under high involvement, people
would generally use the central processing route and under low involvement they would
use the peripheral route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). The ELM, therefore, can explain why
strong arguments can produce persuasion under high involvement. The person would
follow the central route and carefully consider the arguments.
The experiments by Petty and Cacioppo (1984) that demonstrated this logic are
similar to those described above. In a pilot study, they manipulated involvement by either
informing participants that their university was considering a tuition increase (high
involvement) or another, similar university was considering a tuition increase (low
involvement). In the actual experiment, they used the comprehensive examination
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manipulation previously described. Results demonstrated that under high involvement
participants used the central route and were persuaded by strong arguments. Under low
involvement they used the peripheral route and were persuaded by peripheral cues (e.g.,
number of arguments) not by argument quality. This difference in depth of processing
was considered to be the reason for the difference in involvement effects.
Summary of value-involvement and outcome-involvement research. The main
distinction that seems to separate outcome-involvement and value-involvement research
is the type of manipulated used. Outcome-involvement research has manipulated
involvement by having participants make “strategic considerations” about some outcome
they can achieve or avoid. On the other hand, value-involvement research has
manipulated involvement by engaging participants' values and morals (Johnson & Eagly,
1989). Whether these two types of involvement are two different constructs, as Johnson
and Eagly's meta-analysis seemed to indicate, or if they are just different levels on an
involvement continuum, as Petty and Cacioppo (1990) suggested, warrants future study.
What does seem to hold is that high value involvement has resulted in close-mindedness
whereas high outcome involvement has resulted in increased depth of processing when
accompanied by strong arguments. Explaining these conflicting results seems to be more
easily accomplished by prescribing different involvement constructs.
A recent study by Maio and Olson (1995) looked empirically at the difference
between outcome involvement and value involvement in regards to persuasion. They
showed with this study that there might in fact be different involvement constructs. Maio
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and Olson manipulated type of involvement by using what was labeled as an attitudefimction manipulation. Participants in the outcome-involvement group were asked to rate
the importance of attaining or avoiding different outcomes (e.g., receiving money, losing
respect, etc.). Maio and Olson then took an average of these responses to get an outcome
importance index for each participant. Participants were then asked to comply with
various academic requests (e.g., write an essay). They were asked to write how each
request would support or oppose each o f the previously listed important outcomes. The
value-involvement condition was similar except participants were asked to rate the
importance of certain values (e.g., freedom, individualism, etc.) and how the academic
requests would support or oppose these values.
This manipulation controlled for knowledge as a possible confounding variable in
an effort to help discern if the different types o f involvement found by Johnson and Eagly
(1989) were actually due to different constructs and not due to confounds (as Petty and
Cacioppo (1990) suggested). Maio and Olson (1995) also used the same dependent
variable (comprehensive examinations) that Petty and Cacioppo (1979a, 1979b, 1984)
utilized in many of their involvement studies. Lastly, participants were given either
strong or weak arguments to support these comprehensive examinations. Again, similar
to the arguments use by Petty and Cacioppo (1979a, 1979b, 1984).
Results showed that type of involvement moderated the relationship between
argument processing and involvement. This effect was seen only for those participants
who reported that the outcomes or values they rated were important. However, 88% of
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the participants met this criterion. Breaking down the moderating effects, participants in
the high outcome-involvement condition were more persuaded by strong arguments than
by weak arguments, regardless o f level of involvement. Participants in the high valueinvolvement condition were not affected by argument strength whereas those in the low
value-involvement condition were more persuaded by strong arguments.
Results o f the study by Maio and Olson (1995) are interesting in a couple of ways.
First, Maio and Olson found no main effect for outcome involvement. The authors
speculated that Johnson and Eagly (1989) may have been correct in suggesting that the
outcome-involvement manipulation has a weak effect overall. Results also showed that
high value involvement resulted in a reduced amount of processing. This is a slightly
different effect than that suggested by Johnson and Eagly (1989), who speculated that the
inhibiting effect of value involvement was due to biased processing, not a reduction in
processing. This was the first study that directly crossed value involvement with
argument strength. Recall that the traditional value-involvement studies started by Sherif
and his colleagues simply looked at the effect o f involvement on persuasion without an
argument strength manipulation. Maio and Olson suggested that their results show that
value involvement may motivate people to just ignore arguments rather than process
them with a biased view. This effect may also be a result o f close-mindedness, similar to
what was shown by Johnson et al. (1995). Close-mindedness would be able to explain
both biased processing and simply ignoring arguments when values are involved. Future
research will need to sort out this possible difference.
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The present study. The few studies conducted to investigate the effects of
involvement on information search and related topics found that high outcome
involvement increased information search and idea generation (Atoum & Farah, 1993;
Takemura, 1994). Consistent with the proposed difference in involvement constructs by
Johnson and Eagly (1989), it is hypothesized in this study that the benefit of personal
involvement would decrease under conditions of high value involvement. This prediction
is based on the idea that if a person's values are highly involved s/he will have strong
feelings and attitudes on that issue. Because of this, the value-involved person will
activate a powerful schema on the issue and will not feel the need to search for additional
information. They are more likely to be close-minded (Johnson et al., 1995; Maio and
Olson, 1995). They will have very strong ideas based on their values and morals and will
believe that there are only a few (maybe even one) correct ways to handle the situation,
diminishing the need to generate alternatives based on searched information. Hypothesis
four follows from these arguments.

Hypothesis 4: A problem that elicits high value involvement will result in a lower amount
of information search when compared to a problem that elicits high outcome
involvement. Information search behaviors will be lowest if the problem is not involving.

Based on the importance of information search in creative problem solving, it is
expected that involvement will have similar effects on the creativity of problem solutions
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as it does on information search. Dudek and Cote (1994) reported that problem finding is
a product of task involvement and the greater the involvement o f the problem solver the
more creative s/he should be, provided there is sufficient knowledge and experience.
Finke et al. (1992) also reported that people need to be involved to be creative and Ruscio
et al. (1998) found that involvement was significantly related to creativity in three
different creativity tasks (structure-building, collage-making, and poem-writing).
It is hypothesized in this study that involvement will affect the creativity of
solutions to ill-defined problems, and, more specifically, the type of involvement, value
versus outcome, will determine the specific effect encountered. It was reported above that
people tend to satisfice with the first activated problem representation when not
motivated to engage in problem construction, and that this will have a negative impact on
creative problem solving (Mumford et al., 1994). Involvement that results from the
personal relevance of a problem's outcome should be a motivator to engage in problem
construction. However, involvement that results from the engagement o f personal values
and morals will decrease this motivation because of the close-mindedness it elicits. A
person who is value involved may activate a dominant schema on an issue causing them
to satisfice with an early developed problem representation. This decrease in problem
construction would decrease information search and creativity (Mumford et al., 1994).
Because problem construction affects more than just information search (i.e., the rest of
the creative process) (Mumford et al., 1991) the effect of involvement on creativity is
expected to be only partially mediated by information search behaviors. Determining the

43

actual effects of involvement and need for cognition on problem construction is beyond
the scope of this study. Hypothesis five follows from the above discussion.

Hypothesis 5: A problem that elicits high value involvement will result in less creative
solutions when compared to a problem that elicits high outcome involvement. Creativity
will be lowest if the problem is not involving. This effect will be partially mediated by
information search behaviors.

A Possible Interaction Between Need for Cognition and Personal Involvement
Pieters and Verplanken (1995) discussed that both the need for cognition and
involvement affect the amount of reasoning one does. They found that participants who
were high in need for cognition and highly involved in an election reasoned more about
that election, which in turn affected how they voted in the election. Amount of reasoning
would seem to be related to information search behaviors. The more information one has
the better able they are to reason on a topic. Because both involvement and need for
cognition can affect reasoning (Pieters & Verplanken, 1995), depth of processing (Petty
and Cacioppo, 1984, 1986), and information search behaviors (Takemura, 1994;
Verplanken, 1993), it is worth speculating that an interaction between need for cognition
and type of involvement may occur. Specifically, certain people might be able to
overcome the close-mindedness hypothesized to occur under high value involvement.
These people would need to be motivated to find a fuller understanding of an issue,
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regardless o f the value involvement, before they would come to any conclusions about
that issue. These people would have to be cognitively oriented and enjoy thinking things
out completely. In other words, they should be high in need for cognition.
Scudder et al. (1994) speculated that group members low in need for cognition
would be more inclined to "loaf' in situations that are not personally involving. They
suggested that more involving tasks would counteract the “loafing” effect o f those with
low need for cognition. Cacioppo et al. discussed further that under conditions of very
high and very low involvement, one's need for cognition would not matter. High
involvement would produce a ceiling effect and low involvement would produce a floor
effect, both o f which would not allow for an additional effect of need for cognition.
Because Petty and Cacioppo have done their involvement work with outcome
involvement, these hypothesized ceiling and floor effects were probably developed with
this type o f involvement in mind. People with high outcome involvement would be so
concerned about the result of their problem solving or decision making effort that both
high and low need for cognition individuals would be motivated to process information.
The present study, therefore, predicts this ceiling effect will be found with the outcomeinvolvement manipulation. However, neither a floor effect under low involvement nor a
ceiling effect under value involvement is anticipated. Reasons for these predictions are
addressed next.
Axsom, Yates ,and Chaiken (1987) empirically addressed the need for
cognition/involvement interaction. A main effect of involvement was found where
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participants under high involvement were influenced more by strong arguments whereas
those in the low involvement condition were influenced more by peripheral cues (the
number of other people agreeing with the message). This result was consistent with the
ELM prediction (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). However, this difference disappeared when
participant’s need for cognition was considered. High need for cognition produced high
message-relevant thoughts under conditions o f low involvement and high involvement.
For participants low in need for cognition, however, high involvement produced more
message relevant thoughts whereas low involvement induced the use o f heuristic and
peripheral cues.
Axsom et al. (1987) demonstrated that when participants were highly involved
they had an increased number of message-relevant thoughts regardless of level of need
for cognition, showing the ceiling effect o f high involvement discussed by Cacioppo et al.
(1996). Involvement in this study was considered outcome involvement. Participants
were asked to listen to a debate on whether probation should be used as an alternative to
imprisonment. Those in the high involvement condition were told that the experiment
was taking place in their community. Thus, the result of the debate would be the outcome
o f probation in their community, rather than imprisonment. This study adds empirical
evidence that outcome involvement may produce a high amount of information search in
participants regardless of their need for cognition, as is hypothesized in the present study.
A second relevant finding by Axsom et al. (1987) was that high need for cognition
increased message relevant thoughts for participants who were in the low involvement
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condition. Thus, the floor effect for low involvement discussed by Cacioppo et at. (1996)
was not found. Under conditions of low involvement, there was an effect of need for
cognition. Similarly, in the present study, it is predicted that participants with a high need
for cognition will have the motivation to actively process information even under
conditions of low involvement. Specifically, it is hypothesized that under conditions of
low involvement, participants high in need for cognition should engage in more
information search behaviors than those low in need for cognition. It should be
mentioned that if the low involvement condition in the Axsom et al. study was actually
closer to moderate involvement (as Axsom et al. speculated), then the prediction by
Cacioppo et al. may still hold true (i.e., a floor effect for low involvement).
The last issue to consider is the effect of need for cognition under conditions of
value involvement. If value involvement is in fact found to produce a different effect than
outcome involvement, then need for cognition may affect value involvement differently
than it does outcome involvement. Specifically, it is hypothesized that people high in
need for cognition should be able to overcome the tunneling effect o f value involvement
and search for as much information as those who are outcome-involved. Value
involvement has been found to inhibit persuasion (Johnson & Eagly, 1989) and produce
close-mindedness (Johnson et al., 1995; Maio & Olson, 1995). As predicted in hypothesis
three, participants in this condition may not feel the need to search for as much
information as may those who are in the outcome-involvement condition. However,
people high in need for cognition have been shown to enjoy thinking and are better able
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to access thoughts on issues (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Thus, these people should be more
motivated to process and search for information and therefore be able to overcome the
close-mindedness brought on by the value involvement. People high in need for cognition
should search for as much information under conditions of value involvement as they
would under conditions of outcome involvement. Hypothesis six follows from this
speculation. See Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of these predictions.

Hypothesis 6: Type of involvement will interact with need for cognition to produce the
following results. Under conditions of outcome involvement, participants will have a high
amount of information search regardless of their need for cognition. Under conditions of
value involvement, participants will have a medium amount of information search if they
have a low need for cognition and a high amount of information search if they have a
high need for cognition. Under conditions of low involvement, participants will have a
low amount of information search if they have a low need for cognition and a medium
amount of information search if they have a high need for cognition.

Consistent with hypothesis two and four, the interaction effect o f need for
cognition and involvement is also expected to be found in the resultant creativity.
Hypothesis seven addresses this issue. See Figure 3 for a graphical depiction of these
results.
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Figure 2
Hypothesized need for cognition / type of involvement interaction
on information search behaviors
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Figure 3
Hypothesized need for cognition / type of involvement interaction
on creativity
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Hypothesis 7: Type of involvement will interact with need for cognition to produce the
following results. Under conditions of outcome involvement, participants will produce
highly creative solutions regardless of their need for cognition. Under conditions of value
involvement, participants will produce solutions with medium creativity if they have a
low need for cognition and high creativity if they have a high need for cognition. Under
conditions of low involvement, participants will produce solutions with low creativity if
they have a low need for cognition and medium creativity if they have a high need for
cognition.

Method
Participants
Participants were 170 college students recruited from psychology classes at a
Midwestern university. Course credit or extra credit was awarded after participation in the
experiment. Data from 20 participants were discarded for a number o f different reasons,
such as not understanding English very well, correctly guessing the manipulation, not
completing the questionnaires, or running into complications with the computer program.
The remaining 150 participants were evenly distributed across the three involvement
conditions, outcome, value, and low. The sample consisted of 110 females and 37 males
(3 participants did not report gender). This breakdown was consistent with the proportion
of male/female psychology majors at the university. The average age of the participants
was 22.59 years (SD = 5.89). Attained education level was fairly evenly distributed: (a)

51

53 first year students, (b) 34 sophomores, (c) 29 juniors, (d) 28 seniors, (e) 4 others, and
(f) 2 missing answers.
Independent Variables
Need for cognition. Participants’ need for cognition was measured using the short
version o f a scale developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). This scale consists o f 18
Likert-type statements (see Appendix A). Cacioppo and Petty found the original 34 item
scale to be reliable (split half = .87) as well as valid (construct, predictive, and
discriminant). These psychometric properties continue to be found with repeated use of
the scale. For example, Thompson and Zanna (1995) found a 's = .65 and .78 using the
34-item scale and Venkatraman and Price (1990) found a = .88, also using the full scale.
The 18 item short version of the scale has been shown to be as reliable as the full scale.
Using this scale, Sadowski and Gulgoz (1992) found alpha’s o f a = .91 and a = .92. Also
using the 18 item version, Sadowski (1993) found a = .86. Finally, using a 15-item Dutch
version o f the scale, Verplanken (1993) found a = .80. Reliability o f the 18 item scale
was found to be very good in this study also, a = .88.
Personal involvement. Involvement was manipulated by the type of problem
given to the participants. Three problems were used, one to address value involvement,
one to address outcome involvement, and one to address low involvement. The valueinvolvement problem (Appendix B) is a modification of a problem found in past research
to engage a person's values and morals (Scherer, Butler, Reiter-Palmon, & Weiss, 1994).
The issue in this problem centered on a first year college student, Sally, whose roommate
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smokes marijuana in their dorm room. This problem was referred to as Sally’s Problem.
The outcome-involvement problem (Appendix C) is a modification o f the comprehensive
exam issue developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1979a). It was designed so that the
outcome o f the problem solving effort could have important implications for the
participant (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). Specifically, the outcome-involvement problem,
referred to as the Exam Problem, informed participants that their university was
considering requiring students to pass a comprehensive exam before graduation unless a
more effective way of assessing the quality o f their education could be discovered.
Participants in the outcome-involvement condition were informed that university
administrators would consider their responses to the problem when attempting to resolve
the issue. This was done in an effort to make them believe their input could make a
difference on the outcome o f the problem. The low involvement problem (Appendix D)
also was adapted from Scherer et al. (1994), and was chosen because it was not found to
be personally involving for college students. This problem was referred to as Sam's
Problem and described a pest control technician who needs money but is reluctant to take
more jobs because of safety reasons.
The three problems used in this study were selected based on the results o f a pilot
study. Two problems from each of the involvement conditions (value, outcome, and low)
were piloted. The high value-involvement, high outcome-involvement, and low
involvement problems not chosen (Mark’s Problem, Night Classes Problem, and Barb's
Problem, respectively) are presented in Appendixes E, F, and G, respectively; the value
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involvement and low involvement problems were adapted from Scherer et al. (1994).
Those who participated in the pilot study were asked to read the problem presented to
them and to list all the additional information they would want to receive or know about
the problem in order to provide a good solution. They were asked to provide this
information so that it could be used to develop searchable information for the main study.
After participants completed listing this information they completed a
manipulation check questionnaire. This questionnaire was constructed to determine if the
problems produced the predicted type of involvement. Based on the assertion that value
involvement and outcome involvement are different constructs, different items were
written to measure each type of involvement, along with items that addressed general
high versus low involvement. Thus, the manipulation check questionnaire actually
consisted of several subscales, each developed to ensure the problems produced the
desired involvement effects. The items developed for each sub-scale are presented in
Appendix H.
Similar to the rational scaling method of developing biographical-data measures
(Mumford & Owens, 1987), items on this questionnaire were written based on the
definition of each type of involvement discussed earlier. Selection of the items included
in the final version of each of the subscales was based on an internal consistency analysis.
This rational method of scale development based on construct definitions followed by an
item analysis used to chose the best items is considered to be a sufficient approach to
constructing a scale with content and construct validity (Nunnnally & Berstein, 1994).
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Thus, this method was considered adequate for the manipulation check purpose o f this
scale. The questionnaire was used as a manipulation check in the main study as well as in
the pilot study. All items were measures on a five-point scale.
Pilot study results. Analysis of the low involvement manipulation check subscale
revealed that Sam's Problem resulted in a lower level of involvement than Barb's Problem
(M = 2.87 versus M = 3.19). A lower score reflected lower involvement. Analysis of the
outcome-involvement subscale showed that the Exam Problem produced a higher level of
outcome involvement than the Night Classes Problem (M = 3.77 versus M = 3.42).
Analysis o f the value-involvement subscale revealed that Sally's Problem produced a
higher level of value involvement than Mark's Problem (M = 3.38 versus M = 3.22).
Finally, an analysis of the manipulation check subscale whose items differentiated
between high value involvement and high outcome involvement provided evidence that
the problems produced the desired different types of involvement (Sally M = 3.24, Mark
M = 3.20, Exam M = 2.65, Night Classes M = 2.67; a high score indicated high value
involvement and a low score indicated high outcome involvement).
Cronbach's coefficient alpha was used to assess the reliability of each of the four
involvement sub-scales. Reliabilities of the low, outcome, and value sub-scales were very
good (a = .94, a = .91, and a = .89, respectively). The reliability of the sub-scale used to
differentiate between value and outcome involvement was low (a = .50). However, the
means were in the correct directions, which was considered sufficient for the purpose of
the pilot study. Also, because this subscale measured two different constructs, high
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internal consistency was not expected. The subscale was used to ensure that problems
used to produce value involvement versus outcome involvement did not result in just
general high involvement but in a specific type o f high involvement.
Dependent Measures
Information search behaviors. Information search behaviors were measured by
calculating the amount of information participants looked at and the amount of time they
engaged in information search behaviors. As part of the pilot study discussed above, each
participant was asked to provide additional information (other than that given in the
problem) they felt would be beneficial in solving each of the three problems (see
Appendix I for the instructions read to the pilot study participants). The information
gathered during this pilot study was made available to participants to search for in the
main study via a computer. Each problem had 51 pieces o f information participants could
peruse (the information for Sally's problem, the Exam problem, and Sam's problem are
presented in Appendixes J, K, and L, respectively). Attempts were made to equate each of
the three problems on length o f the information statements.
Visual Basic was used to write a computer program that allowed participants to
search for desired information. The computer saved to memory the total number of pieces
of information each participant viewed along with the total amount of time each
participant spent on information search behaviors. Participants also had the option to
reread the problem while searching for information in case they forgot specific aspects
presented in the actual problem. The time spent on reviewing the problem was included
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in the total time spent searching. It was decided that this time was spent on thinking about
the problem, and possibly thinking about what additional information to view; both of
these activities were considered information search behaviors. Results revealed that the
average number of times a problem was reviewed by a participant was less than one and
statistically equal in all three involvement conditions, F (2,147) = .41, MSE = .29, ns
(value involvement M —.62 fSD = .81], outcome involvement M = .74 fSD —.92], low
involvement M = .76 fSD = .77]). Finally, a composite measure of information search
behaviors was computed by standardizing and averaging the amount of time spent
searching and the number of items searched. This score will be referred to as the
information search composite score.
Creativity. The creativity of each solution was determined by obtaining ratings for
originality and appropriateness (Feist, 1998; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Runco &
Charles, 1993). Ratings were obtained using the consensual assessment technique
developed by Hennessey and Amabile (1988). This technique is based on the assumption
that creativity can be recognized and agreed upon by judges familiar with the creativity
domain. Amabile (1996) stated that these judges need to be knowledgeable, but do not
need to be experts. She reported that this consensual rating technique can be used to
reliably rate the creativity of many different types of tasks. Therefore, two graduate
students familiar with the creativity domain were utilized to rate each participant's
solution on originality and appropriateness.
Raters were trained before distributing the actual solutions to be rated. During this
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training, solutions similar to those actually given to participants were discussed. This
training also involved discussing with raters the consensual rating process. They were
instructed that each person would rate the solution independently and then meet to reach
consensus on any disagreements through open discussion. Also, definitions o f the
originality and appropriateness rating scales were discussed until the raters had a firm
grasp of the scale anchors. Raters were instructed to read through all solutions before
assigning ratings. It was also emphasized that the entire rating scale should be used.
Judges were not informed as to the experimental conditions the solutions represented.
Appropriateness was rated using a four-point rating scale and was defined as a
solution that is (a) pragmatic, (b) socially responsible, and (c) ethical (Appendix M)
(adapted from Reiter-Palmon, Collins and Scherer, 1997). Two judges individually rated
the appropriateness of each solution. Interrater reliability was calculated to be .72. The
two independent ratings were identical for 119 of the solutions, differed by one for 24 of
the solutions, and different by two for only 7 of the solutions. Judges resolved the 31
disagreements through discussion. The resulting consensus ratings were used for all
analyses. The frequency distribution of solutions across the four appropriateness ratings is
presented in Figure 4.
Originality was rated using a six-point scale and was defined as: the degree to
which the solution is not structured by the problem presented and goes beyond it, and the
degree of novelty and uniqueness of the solution (Appendix N) (adapted from ReiterPalmon et al., 1997). The originality raters were first asked to decide whether or not each
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Figure 4
Frequency Distribution o f Appropriateness Ratings
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solution was structured by the problem. A solution that was structured by the problem
would receive an originality rating of one to three based on the uniqueness of the
response. A solution that was unstructured by the problem would receive a rating of four
to six, also depending on the degree o f uniqueness of the response. The Kappa coefficient
of agreement for this structured/unstructured sorting indicated that the judges agreed
significantly more often than chance (K = .6351, z = 9.53, p < .001).
After solutions were sorted as being structured/unstructured, they were rated for
originality independently by two judges. Interrater reliability for these originality ratings
was .95. The two independent ratings were identical for 109 of the solutions, differed by
one for 40 of the solutions, and different by two for only 1 solution. Through discussion,
raters came to a consensus on the ratings that differed. The resulting consensus ratings
were used for all analyses. The frequency distribution of solutions across the six
originality ratings is presented in Figure 5. Finally, an overall creativity score was
obtained by combining the originality and appropriateness ratings. The ratings were
standardized and then averaged for each solution (Harrington, Block, & Block, 1983).
This score will be referred to as the creativity composite score.
Additional Measures
Arousal. A perceived arousal scale was developed to measure how aroused each
participant became while solving his/her problem (see Appendix O). This scale was a
combined and modified version of scales developed by Anderson, Deuser, and DeNeve
(1995) and Scherer et al. (1994). This arousal scale was used to determine if arousal

Figure 5

Frequency Distribution of Originality Ratings

Originality Rating
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confounds with value involvement in producing a decrease in information search activity
and creative problem solving. Specifically, value involvement may produce a closeminded effect that is in part due to this arousal component, a component not present in an
outcome-involvement manipulation. An issue that addresses one's values or morals is
likely to produce some type of emotional reaction, and arousal is an "integral" part of
emotion (Clark, 1982). Clark (1982) pointed out that anything that causes an emotional
reaction, whether positive or negative, would usually be accompanied by autonomic
arousal. Value involvement, then, may produce increased arousal, which in turn, may
partly account for a decrease in information search activity and/or creativity.
Divergent thinking. Divergent-thinking ability was measured with two forms of
the Uses Test (Guilford, 1967). Participants were asked to list uses for a wooden pencil
and a wire coat hanger. Divergent thinking was measured to ensure that any differences
found in creative problem solving could not be attributed solely to differences in
divergent-thinking ability. The two individual tests were averaged to produce one
divergent-thinking score for each participant.
Procedure
A brief description of the study was read to each participant (see Appendix P).
After this description was read, students who agreed to participate signed an adult consent
form, and were assigned to one o f the three involvement conditions. Participants worked
alone in a small room that contained one computer to eliminate any social-comparison
factors (e.g., limiting search behaviors based on when others finished).
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Before typing their solution to the problem, participants had the opportunity to
search and receive information they felt would facilitate solution generation. The 51
pieces o f information for each problem gathered during the pilot study were made
available to participants to search for via a computer. The 51 pieces o f information were
grouped into categories and were displayed in a type o f menu system. Participants had the
opportunity to follow any menu item desired. Due to computer availability, half o f the
participants in each o f the three involvement conditions completed the experiment using
older model computers (Gateway 2000 386SX/16) and half using modem computers
(Gateway E-3200 with Pentium II processors). Therefore, speed o f computers was evenly
distributed in each condition.
The computer program began by displaying one of the three involvement
problems along with the directions on how to use the program (see Figure 6 for the initial
computer screen presented to participants). Also on this first screen was a start button.
The program asked the participant to click this button when they had finished completely
reading the problem and the directions. Once the start button was clicked, the computer
recorded the time the participant started and the problem they were working on into two
files on a computer diskette, one that would contain the solution the participant developed
and one that would record the information requested.
After clicking the Start button, the participant was presented with a main menu
screen (see Figure 7). Each problem had four main menu items (see Appendixes J-L).
Once one o f these four items was selected, a secondary menu was displayed that

Figure 6

Initial computer screen presented to participants

Problem
T he purpose o f this study is to obtain solutions to the problem presented below However, before you am asked to
prcmde a salutiom to thi» problem you veil have the opportunity to look at different items o f inform ation about the
problem v'hach m ay help to clarify any questions you h a w and m ay aLo help you ofTer a better solution VTum you have
seen all the inform ation you feel will aid m generating your solution you will be asked to type that solution mto the

Please click on the white box next to "Participant Number" and type in the number found on the top of your packet
Thank you for your participation. Please ask the experimenter any questions you may have throughout this process
Read the problem c arefully and click start when you are ready to begin

Participant Number

Start

ISam's Problem
Sam is a technician in a large pest control company. Each week, Sam provides pest control assessments and treatm ents
fo r several dozen regular accounts in his territory and handles any "spot jobs" th at come up if he has enough tim e. Sam enjoys his
work because the hours are flexible and he is his own boss. In addition, the pay is commission-based and since Sam is an excellent
technician, he makes good money. O n the other hand, Sam believes that the work can be dangerous becuase it calls fo r lifting and
carrying heavy equipment without assistance. M any technicians in the com pany have had shoulder and back injuries as a result o f
such strenuous job demands. In the past few m onths, Sam's family has had additional expenses that Sam's regular work load cannot
cover. Sam is working harder and faster, but the depressed econom y has made "spot jobs" scarce and has removed any hope o f
finding a higher paying job elsewhere. Recently, Sam was offered a "spot job" that would pay enough to cover several overdue bills,
but would involve a great deal o f highly strenuous lifting, carrying and maneuvering o f equipment and supplies Sam needs the m oney
th at this job would provide; however, he is afraid o f the considerable personal risk. Sam does not know what to do, can you offer a
solution to his problem?
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Figure 7
Main menu computer screen

Main M enu

Below is a menu o f the mfotm.ati.on available to you about the problem you read Just click on the menu item
which you would like to tead. Use the same procedure for any following screens. Always click on the numbei of
the item you wish to search
Click on "View Problem" if you would like to read the problem again

Click on "Solve Problem" when you are ready to type in your solution to the problem. Howevet, once you click
"Solve Problem" you will notbe able to return and search for more information.

O ccupational Information

View Pioblem
F inancial Information

S p ecific J ob Information

Solve Problem
Information About Sam

Rem em ber, you n e e d only look a t the information w hich you feel will b e beneficial in solving this problem
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contained two to four items. When one of these items was selected the participant was
presented with three to five questions that addressed that item. The participant then
selected the question they wished to have answered (e.g., What content areas will the
comprehensive exam cover?). Once the answer was provided, the computer program
returned the participant to the main menu screen and the process started over again. The
program was designed to return the participant to the original four-item main menu
screen after each piece of information was viewed so that all the information could not be
scanned through quickly.
Also present on the main menu screen were a control button labeled View
Problem and a control button labeled Solve Problem. When the View Problem button was
clicked, the program displayed the problem for participants to reread. After rereading the
problem they clicked a button that returned them to the main menu screen. When a
participant was finished looking at the information they desired, they were instructed to
click the Solve Problem button. Once clicked, the program recorded the time and
displayed a screen with a blank white box and directions asking the participant to type
their solution to the problem into the white box. They were asked to click a Finished
button when their solution was complete. When pushed, this button saved their solution
to a computer disk.
Each time the participant requested an answer to one of the searched questions,
the information selected was recorded in a computer file using a three letter/number code
(see Appendixes J-L). Each article o f information viewed, or each answer provided, was
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counted as one item of information searched. If an item was selected twice, it was
counted twice, although the occurrence of double requests was rare. The total amount of
time each participant spent searching was recorded from when the Start button was
clicked to when the Solve Problem button was clicked. Thus, participants were not timed
while they initially read the problem or while they typed in their solution to the problem.
Once participants finished typing their solution, they were given a packet of
questionnaires containing the Need for Cognition Scale, an arousal scale, the
manipulation check scale, and a demographics questionnaire. After completing these
questionnaires, participants were debriefed and dismissed (see Appendix Q for debriefing
statement).
Analyses
T-tests were used to check the effectiveness of the involvement manipulation. A
one-way analysis o f variance was used to check for differences in arousal based on type
of involvement. The effects o f information search behaviors on creativity were analyzed
using simple regressions. The effects o f need for cognition on information search
behaviors and creative problem solving also were analyzed using simple regressions. A
one-way analysis of variance was used to test the direct effects o f type of involvement on
information search behaviors and creative problem solving. Contrasts were used to test
for differences among the three involvement groups.
Mediation effects were analyzed based on the recommendations by Baron and
Kenny (1986). Accordingly, three regression equations were used to test for each
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mediated effect. First, the dependent variable was regressed on the independent variable.
Second, the mediator was regressed on the independent variable. Third, the dependent
variable was regressed on the mediator and the independent variable. Mediation would be
shown by significant results in the first two regression equations and a reduced or
eliminated effect o f the independent variable on the dependent variable in the third
equation. Type o f involvement was effect coded for these analyses.
The interaction effects of need for cognition and type of involvement were
analyzed using multiple regression. Once again type of involvement was effect coded for
these analyses. For graphing purposes and to explore trends in the data, need for
cognition was split into top third and bottom third scores and then crossed with type of
involvement in order to obtain cell means.
Results
Manipulation Check
Answers to the manipulation check questionnaire showed that participants
reported experiencing the expected type o f involvement based on their assigned
experimental condition. Those participants in the low involvement group were
significantly less involved than were those in the high outcome-involvement group, t (98)
= -7.68, p < .05 (M = 2.79 and M = 3.59, respectively) and those in the high valueinvolvement group, t (98) = -1.92, p < .05 (M = 2.79 and M = 3.02, respectively).
Participants in the high outcome-involvement group were more concerned with the
solution or outcome o f the problem than were those in the low involvement group, t (98)
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= 10.35, p < .05 (M = 3.89 and M = 2.75, respectively). Participants in the high valueinvolvement group reported having their values and morals affected to a higher degree
than did those in the low involvement group, t (98) = -2.91, p < .05 (M = 3.16 and M =
2.80, respectively). Finally, analyses revealed that the outcome- and value-involvement
problems elicited different types o f high involvement, t (98) = -12.52, p < .05 (M = 3.40
for value and M = 2.31 for outcome, a high score represents high value involvement and a
low score represents high outcome involvement). Reliabilities for the manipulation check
sub-scales were acceptable (low vs. high involvement, a = .90; low vs. outcome
involvement, a = .89; low vs. value involvement,

a =

.85; value vs. outcome

involvement, a = .78).
Arousal Check
The arousal scale was analyzed to ensure that any effects found to relate to value
involvement could not be attributed to increased levels of arousal. The arousal scale was
found to have adequate reliability, a = .83. Means were calculated for each o f the three
involvement groups (M = 2.83 for low involvement, M = 3.00 for outcome involvement,
and M = 2.98 for value involvement). These means did not differ significantly, F (2,147)
= 1.56, MSE = .44, ns. Therefore, effects related to value involvement will be considered
to result from the value manipulation, not from increased levels o f arousal. However, the
arousal scale measured perceived arousal as opposed to physical arousal. Thus, an arousal
effect would not be seen if participants did not correctly identify their physiological state
at that time.
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Means and Correlations
Relevant means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1. On average,
people viewed about 20 items of information (M = 20.83, SD = 17.92). They looked at
this information while spending about 13 minutes searching (M = 12.71, SD = 10.80). On
average, participants generated about six items on each of the divergent-thinking
measures (M = 6.18, SD = 3.25).
Relevant correlations are presented in Table 2. O f particular interest, time spent
searching was correlated with originality, appropriateness, and the creativity composite
scores (r = .15, .15, and .20, respectively, p < .05). The amount of information viewed
also correlated with originality, appropriateness and the creativity composite scores (r =
.22, .14, and .24, respectively, p < .05). The information search composite also correlated
with originality, appropriateness, and the creativity composite scores (r = .20, . 16, and
.24, respectively, p < .05). As expected, amount of information viewed correlated with
amount of time spent searching (r = .63, p < .05). The correlation between originality and
appropriateness only approached significance (r = .11, p = .09), showing that these two
measured were addressing different aspects of creativity.
The absence o f certain correlations is also of interest. Divergent-thinking ability
did not correlate with the originality, appropriateness, or overall creativity of problem
solutions. Also, need for cognition was not related to the originality, appropriateness or
overall creativity of the solutions. Need for cognition also did not correlate with the
information search measures. Unexpectedly, divergent-thinking ability correlated
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Table 1

Relevant Means and Standard Deviations

Variables

M

SD

Min

Max

Divergent thinking uses test #1

5.78

2.98

0

21

Divergent thinking uses test #2

6.59

3.95

0

23

Amount o f information searched (items)

20.83

17.92

0

68

Amount o f time spent searching (minutes)

12.71

10.80

0

61

Information search composite (z-score)

.00

.090

-1.15

3.18

Originality rating (6-point scale)

2.83

1.93

1

6

Appropriateness rating (4-point scale)

3.45

.69

1

4

Creativity composite (z-score)

.00

.74

-2.24

1.22

Need for Cognition (5-point scale)

3.49

.66

1.61

4.94

Perceived arousal (5-point scale)

2.94

.54

1.42

4.42
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Table 2

Pearson Correlations Among Variables

Variable

1

1. Need for Cognition

1.00

2. Divergent thinking

3

4

5

6

7

8

.08

.01

.06

.04

.03

.07

.07

1.00

-.22** -.08

-.17*

.01

-.07

-.04

.15*

20**

2

Information search measures
3. Time spent searching
4. Amount searched

1.00

.63** .90** .15*
1.00

5. Search composite score

90**

22**

.14*

24**

1.00

20**

.16*

24**

1.00

.lla

24**

1.00

24**

Creativity measures
6. Originality ratings
7. Appropriateness ratings
8. Creativity composite
*p < .05, **2 < -01, ap = .09.

1.00
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negatively with the amount o f time spent searching and the information search composite
(r = -.22 and -.17, respectively, p < .05). However, differences in information search
behaviors were predicted to be a direct result of the involvement manipulation, and this
manipulation was achieved by the problem given to participants. Thus, effects o f the
manipulation should only be seen in the solution to the problem, not in the divergent
thinking tests. Although, it may be possible that those participants who engaged in a large
amount of information search behaviors were fatigued by the time they were given the
divergent-thinking tests, resulting in the negative correlations. However, this assertion is
purely speculative because no divergent-thinking differences were predicted in relation to
information search behaviors.
Information Search Behaviors
Effects o f type of involvement. Table 3 presents the analysis of variance results
for type o f involvement on information search behaviors. Table 4 displays the cell means
for these analyses. Results showed that involvement affected the number o f items
participants searched for before providing a solution to the problem, F (2,147) = 6.12, p <
.05, supporting hypothesis four. Contrasts revealed that participants in the high outcomeinvolvement condition looked at more information than did those in either the low
involvement condition (t (147) = 3.50, p < .05) or high value-involvement condition (t
(147) = 1.88, p < .05). Participants in the value condition also looked at more information
than did those in the low involvement condition (t (147) = -1.62, p = .05).
Similar differences were encountered with involvement and the amount o f time
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Table 3

Analysis of Variance Results for Type of Involvement on Information Search Behaviors

Source

df

MS

F

E

Number o f items searched

2

1839.71

6.12

.00

Error

147

300.61

Time spent searching

2

748.36

6.92

.00

Error

147

108.11

7.92

.00

Information search composite

2

5.92

Error

147

.75

74

Table 4

Mean Information Search Scores for Each Type of Involvement

Involvement
condition

N

Number o f
items searched *'

Time spent
searching

Search
composite

Low

50

14.92 (13.70)

9.85

(8.38)

-.30

(.72)

Outcome

50

27.04 (19.17)

17.11

(12.42)

.38

(.97)

Value

50

20.52 (18.62)

11.16 (10.00)

-.08

(.88)

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent standard deviations. Time spent searching
represents minutes. The search composite is a z-score.
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spent on information search behaviors (F (2,147) = 6.92, p < .05). Participants in the high
outcome-involvement condition spent more time searching for information than did those
participants in the low involvement condition (t (147) = 3.49, p < .05) and those in the
high value-involvement condition (t (147) = 2.86, p < .05). Participants in the high valueinvolvement condition did not spend significantly more time searching for information
than did those in the low involvement condition (t (147) = -63, ns), although means were
in the correct direction (value M = 11.16 minutes and low M = 9.85 minutes).
Finally, type of involvement significantly affected participant's information search
composite scores (F (2,147) = 7.92, p < .05). Participants in the high outcomeinvolvement condition had higher composite scores than did the participants in either the
low involvement condition (t (147) = 3.90, p < .05) or the high value-involvement
condition (t (147) = 2.64, p < .05). Participants in the value and low involvement
conditions did not differ significantly from one another (t (147) = -1.25, ns). Means in
these condition were again in the correct direction (value M = -.08 and low M = -.30).
Effects o f need for cognition. Need for cognition did not predict information
search behaviors. Specifically, need for cognition did not predict number o f items viewed
(F (1,148) = .46), amount o f time spent searching (F (1,148) = .01), or the information
search composite score (F (1,148) = .19). Therefore, hypothesis two was not supported. A
summary of these regression analyses is displayed in Table 5.
Creativity
Effects of information search behaviors. Table 6 presents the analyses of the
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Table 5

Cognition

Variable

B

SE B

P

t

Number o f items searched

.003

1.51

2.22

.06

.68

Time spent searching

.000

.15

1.34

.01

.11

Information search composite

.001

.05

.11

.04

.44
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Table 6

Simple Regression Analysis of the Effects of Information Search Behaviors on Creativity

E!

B

SE B

P

t

E

Number o f items searched

.05

.02

.01

.22

2.79

.01

Time spent searching

.02

.03

.01

.15

1.79

.08

Information search composite

.04

.44

.17

.20

2.54

.01

Number of items searched

.02

.005

.003

.14

1.71

.09

Time spent searching

.02

.01

.005

.15

1.84

.07

Information search composite

.03

.12

.06

.16

1.97

.05

Number o f items searched

.06

.01

.003

.24

3.06

.00

Time spent searching

.04

.01

.01

.20

2.46

.02

Information search composite

.06

.20

.07

.24

3.06

.00

Variable

Orieinalitv ratines

Annronriateness ratines

Creativity comnosite
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effects of information search behaviors on the creativity ratings. These analyses crossed
the three information search variables (number of items searched, time spent searching,
and the composite score) with the three creativity variables (originality ratings,
appropriateness ratings, and the composite creativity score). These analyses were a test of
hypothesis one.
Regression analyses revealed that information search behaviors predicted the
originality of problem solutions. The number o f items viewed predicted the originality of
solutions (F (1, 148) = 7.80, p < .05). The effect of time spent searching on originality
was marginal (F (1, 148) = 3.21, p = .08). The information search composite score also
predicted the originality o f the solution (F (1, 148) = 6.45, p < .05). The amount of
information searched and the time spent searching had marginal effects on the
appropriateness of solutions (F (1, 148) = 2.92, p = .09 and F (1, 148) = 3.37, p = .07,
respectively). However, the information search composite effectively predicted the
appropriateness ratings (F (1, 148) = 3.86, p = .05). The number of items searched
predicted the creativity composite (F (1, 148) = 9.34, p < .05), as did the amount of time
spent searching (F (1, 148) = 6.04, p < .05). Finally, the information search composite
score was a good predictor of the creativity composite score (F (1,148) = 9.39, p < .05).
Effects o f type o f involvement. Table 7 presents the analysis of variance results
for the effects o f type o f involvement on the creativity ratings. Results revealed that type
of involvement predicted the appropriateness and originality o f solutions and the
creativity composite scores. Cell means are presented in Table 8. These results provided
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Table 7

Analysis of Variance Results for Type of Involvement on Creativity Ratings

Source

df

MS

F

E

Originality ratings

2

16.01

4.49

.01

Error

147

3.56

Appropriateness ratings

2

3.93

9.13

.00

Error

147

.43

Creativity composite

2

6.05

12.61

.00

Error

147

.48
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Table 8

Mean Creativity Scores for Each Type of Involvement

Involvement
condition

N

Originality
rating

Appropriateness
rating

Creativity
composite

Low

50

2.98

(1.99)

3.46

(.61)

.05

(.75)

Outcome

50

3.30

(2.01)

3.72

(.67)

.32

(.60)

Value

50

2.20

(1.63)

3.16

(.68)

-.37

(.72)

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent standard deviations. Ratings were on a 5point scale. The creativity composite is a z-score.
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partial support for hypothesis five.
Type o f involvement influenced the originality of participants' solutions (F
(2.147) = 4.49, p < .05). Contrasts revealed that participants in the high outcomeinvolvement condition were more original than were those in the high value-involvement
condition (t (147) = 2.92, p < .05). Contrary to predictions, participants in the low
involvement condition wrote more original solutions than did participants in the high
value-involvement condition (t (147) = 2.07, p < .05). Although means showed that
solutions were more original in the high outcome-involvement condition (M

= 3.30)

than

in the low involvement condition (M = 2.98), this difference was not statistically
significant (t (147) = .85).
Type o f involvement also had an effect on the appropriateness o f participants'
solutions (F (2,147) = 9.13, p < .05). Participants in the high outcome-involvement
condition wrote more appropriate solutions than did those in the low involvement
condition (t (147) = 1.98, p < .05) and those in the high value-involvement condition (t
(147) = 4.27, p < .05). Contrary to predictions, solutions from participants in the low
involvement condition were more appropriate than were solutions from participants in the
high value-involvement condition (t (147) = 2.29, p < .05).
Finally, type o f involvement also affected the creativity composite scores (F
(2.147) = 12.61, p < .05). Participants in the high outcome-involvement condition
produced more creative solutions than did those in the low involvement conditions (t
(147) = 1.96, p < .05) and those in the high value-involvement condition (t (147) = 4.98,
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£ < .05). Once again contrary to predictions, participants in the low involvement
condition wrote solutions that resulted in higher creativity composite scores than did
those in the high value-involvement condition (t (147) = 3.03, p < .05).
Effects of need for cognition. Participants' need for cognition did not predict the
creativity of the problem solutions. Need for cognition did not predict originality ratings
(F (1,148) = .13), appropriateness ratings (F (1,148) = .81), or the composite creativity
scores (F (1,148) = .71). Thus, hypothesis three was not supported. Results of these
regression analyses are presented in Table 9.
Information search behaviors as a mediator. Hypotheses three and five predicted
that information search behavior would act as a mediator between need for cognition and
creativity and between involvement and creativity. Due to the absence o f a direct effect of
need for cognition on information search behaviors or creativity, analyses were not
performed to test if information search mediated the relation between need for cognition
and creativity.
Although involvement was found to affect both participants' information search
behaviors and the creativity of their solutions, information search behaviors did not act as
a mediator. The absence of a mediated effect was seen with all three information search
measures (amount of information searched, amount of time spent searching, and the
information search composite) crossed with all three creativity indicators (ratings of
appropriateness and originality, and the creativity composite).
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Table 9

Simple Regressions o f Creativity on Need for Cognition

Variable

B

SEB

P

t

Originality ratings

.001

.09

.24

.03

.36

Appropriateness ratings

.005

.08

.09

.07

.90

Creativity composite

.005

.08

.09

.07

.84
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Type of Involvement / Need for Cognition Interaction
Type of involvement did not interact with need for cognition in affecting
information search behaviors (see Table 10) or creativity (see Table 11). Regression
analyses revealed that the interaction term did not result in a significant effect above and
beyond the main effects when considering number o f items searched (AR2 = .00, F = .15),
amount of time spent searching (AR2 = .02, F = 1.30), or the information search
composite score (AR2 = .01, F = .71). Similarly, there was no interaction affect on
appropriateness ratings (AR2 = .01, F = .53), originality ratings (AR2 = .00, F = .37), or the
creativity composite scores (AR2 = .01, F = .86).
Because this was an exploratory analysis, need for cognition was split into top
third and bottom third scores and then crossed with involvement in order to compute cell
means and explore any trends that might be present but hidden due to small statistical
power. Figures 8 to 13 display the graphs of these results. Consistent with predictions,
these graphs showed that under conditions of low involvement and high valueinvolvement, participants higher in need for cognition had higher scores on the
information search measures than did those low in need for cognition. Contrary to
predictions, participants in the high outcome-involvement condition with a high need for
cognition actually had lower scores on the information search indicators than did those
low in need for cognition.
When looking at the interaction effects on creativity, it was found that participants
in the low involvement and high outcome-involvement conditions had about the same
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Table 10

Need for Cosnition on Information Search Behaviors

Variable

R2

F

E

Main effects (301.58)

.08

4.24

.01

Interaction effect (305.11)

.08

2.58

.03

Main effects (108.81)

.09

4.60

.00

Interaction effect (108.37)

.10

3.29

.01

Main effects (.75)

.10

5.34

.00

Interaction effect (.75)

.11

3.48

.01

AR2

F

E

.00

.15

ns

.02

1.30

ns

.01

.71

ns

Number of items searched

Amount o f time spent searching

Information search composite

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square residuals.
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Table 11

Hierarchical Regression Analysis Results for the Interaction o f Type o f Involvement with
Need for Cognition on Creativity

Variable

R2

F

E

Main effects (.43)

.12

6.59

.00

Interaction effect (.43)

.13

4.14

.00

Main effects (3.58)

.06

3.08

.03

Interaction effect (3.61)

.06

1.98

.08

Main effects (.48)

.15

8.93

.00

Interaction effect (.48)

.16

5.69

.00

AR2

F

E

.01

.53

ns

.00

.37

ns

.01

.86

ns

Appropriateness ratings

Originality ratings

Creativity composite

Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square residuals.

Figure 8
Need for cognition / type o f involvement interaction
on amount o f information searched
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Figure 9
Need for cognition / type o f involvement interaction
on amount o f time spent on information search behaviors
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Figure 10
Need for cognition / type o f involvement interaction
on the information search composite scores
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Figure 11
Need for cognition / type o f involvement interaction
on originality ratings
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Figure 12
Need for cognition / type o f involvement interaction
on appropriateness ratings
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Figure 13
Need for cognition / type o f involvement interaction
on the creativity composite scores
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creativity scores regardless o f their need for cognition. However, as predicted, within the
high value-involvement condition, participants with a high need for cognition had higher
originality, appropriateness and creativity composite scores. The reader should remember
that none o f the interaction analyses were statistically significant. Therefore, all trends
presented in the graphs are purely speculative.
Discussion
Overview o f Discussion
The major theoretical purpose of this study was to explore factors that had the
potential to influence information search behaviors and creative problem solving.
Predictions centered on the supposition that if information search behaviors positively
affect creative problem solving, then variables that increase information search behaviors
should also positively affect creativity. Need for cognition and personal involvement
were explored to this end.
Results o f the study were mixed. The following discussion will attempt to sort
through these results and the many analyses conducted. Also, basic and applied
interpretations and implications o f the findings will be explored. Finally, the limitations
o f the study will be discussed, leading into suggested avenues for future research.
A Brief Recapitulation o f Results
Effects of information search behaviors on creative problem solving. This study
provided evidence that a high level of information search enhances creative problem
solving. Composite information search scores, comprised o f amount o f information
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searched and amount o f time spent searching, effectively predicted the originality,
appropriateness, and overall creativity of problem solutions. Individually, amount of
information searched significantly predicted originality and overall creativity of solutions
and marginally predicted appropriateness o f solutions. Amount o f time spent searching
significantly predicted the creativity of solutions and marginally predicted the
appropriateness and originality of solutions. Thus, results demonstrate that information
search behavior is a very important contributor to creative problem solving, supporting
hypothesis one.
Effects of need for cognition on information search behaviors and creativity. It
was predicted that participants who were high in need for cognition would be motivated
to engage in more information search behaviors than those who were low in need for
cognition. This assertion was not supported. Need for cognition was also expected to
affect creativity directed and indirectly through information search behaviors. The
mediation prediction was not supported. Need for cognition also did not affect creativity
directly. Thus, hypotheses two and three were not supported.
Effects o f type o f involvement on information search behaviors and creativity.
Participants in the high outcome-involvement condition searched for more information,
spent more time searching, and had higher information search composite scores than
participants in the low involvement condition and participants in the high valueinvolvement condition. Although means revealed that participants in the high valueinvolvement condition searched for more information, spent more time searching, and
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had higher information search composite scores than participants in the low involvement
condition, only the difference in amount searched reached statistical significance.
Therefore, hypothesis four was partially supported.
Hypothesis five predicted that type o f involvement would affect creativity directly
and indirectly through information search behaviors. Analyses revealed that type of
involvement affected originality ratings, appropriateness ratings, and the creativity
composite scores. However, this effect was not mediated by information search
behaviors. Considering the direct effects of involvement on creativity, results revealed
that high outcome-involvement enhanced the appropriateness, originality, and overall
creativity o f participants' solutions. High value-involvement, on the other hand, had
detrimental effects on participants' creative problem solving. Solutions from participants
in the high value-involvement condition were even less original, appropriate, and creative
in general than solutions from participants in the low involvement condition. Therefore,
hypothesis five received partial support.
To summarize, increases in information search behaviors lead to increases in the
creativity of problem solutions. In regards to personal involvement, information search
was highest in the high outcome-involvement condition, second highest in the high valueinvolvement condition, and lowest in the low involvement condition. Creativity, on the
other hand, was highest in the high outcome-involvement condition, second highest in the
low involvement condition, and lowest in the high value-involvement condition.
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Interpretation of Results
Information search behaviors. Mumford et al. (1991) reported that during the
early stages of creative problem solving, people identify, search, retrieve and encode the
information they will need for the rest o f the creative process. Thus, information search
behaviors are fundamental to the entire creative problem-solving effort. Effective
information search behaviors that provide quality information are essential in developing
creative solutions to ill-defined, novel problems (Mumford, Baughman, Threlfall, et al.,
1996).
Results provide support for the importance of information search behaviors in
creative problem solving. Participants who searched for more information and spent more
time on information search behaviors generated more creative solutions to ill-defined
problems than those who did not engage in as vigorous information search activities. As
discussed by Mumford, Baughman, Supinski, et al. (1996), participants in this study
differed in their information search behaviors and these differences were predictive of
creativity. In support of the Mumford et al. (1991) model, results indicated that people
who engage in extensive information search behaviors prior to solution generation benefit
by having this information available for generating creative solutions to ill-defined, novel
problems. People may use this additional information to generate more alternative
solutions, some of which may be creative, or to generate higher quality and more original
alternatives, or both.
Personal involvement. Chaiken et al. (1996) and Petty et al. (1983) hypothesized
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that personal involvement in an issue increases the amount of thinking a person engages
in concerning that issue. Empirically, Takemura (1994) and Atoum and Farah (1993)
found that personal involvement was positively related to information search behaviors.
Ruscio et al. (1998) showed that high involvement in a task can result in higher creativity.
Thus, indications were that involvement with an issue, task, or problem would have
positive effects on information search behaviors and creativity.
Johnson and Eagly (1989) warned that researchers need to be careful when
studying the effects o f personal involvement. They reported that different types of
involvement would produce different effects. People who are involved by having their
values and morals engaged tend to be close-minded when dealing with an issue. They
tend to behave in a manner consistent with their values and morals and not consider
alternatives. People who are outcome-involved, on the other hand, are only concerned
with the outcome of their efforts and are motivated to engage in extra thought and effort
because these outcomes are personally relevant to them. Thus, Johnson and Eagly
suggested that value involvement and outcome involvement should be researched as
different constructs due to the different aspects of the self engaged by each.
The present study lends support to the assertion that value involvement and
outcome involvement are different constructs. Participants who believed that the outcome
of their problem solving efforts was personally relevant tended to engage in more
information search behaviors and were more creative than those who had their values and
morals engaged and those who were asked to solve a low involvement problem. This
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finding lends support to the research of Petty and Cacioppo and their colleagues who
consistently find that making the outcome o f participants' efforts personally relevant will
motivate them to exert more effort towards information processing.
Results o f the present study reveal even stronger creative problem solving
detriments due to value involvement than expected. In terms o f information search
behaviors, participants in the high value-involvement condition searched for more
information than those in the low involvement condition but searched for less information
than those in the high outcome-involvement condition, as expected. However, valueinvolved participants did not spend significantly more time engaging in information
search behaviors than participants in the low involvement condition. Thus, statistically
speaking, participants who had their values and morals engaged looked at significantly
more information in the same amount of time as those in the low involvement condition.
This seems to indicate that the value-involved participants did not exert much effort in
processing the information they viewed. This may by due to the close-mindedness
brought on by the value issue.
To a large extent, participants in the low involvement condition seem to have
satisficed with the information presented in the problem and did not feel the motivation to
engage in a large amount of information search. This is consistent with Mumford et al.
(1994) who discussed that if people are not motivated to engage in all aspects o f creative
thought, such as problem construction and information search, they will likely terminate
problem-solving processes prematurely. Participants in the low involvement condition
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did not have the motivation to search through information regarding the uninteresting,
irrelevant problem, even though they were told that this information would aid in the
development o f a solution.
When considering the effects of value and low involvement on creativity the
results become even more interesting. As noted, participants in the high valueinvolvement condition engaged in more information search behaviors than those in the
low involvement condition. However, this effect was reversed when the creativity of
problem solutions was considered. Participants in the high value-involvement condition
wrote solutions that were less original and appropriate, and thus, less creative than did
participants in the low involvement condition.
It is interesting to note that participants in the high value-involvement condition
engaged in more information search behaviors but were less creative when compared to
participants in the low involvement condition. Also, as noted, participants in the high
value-involvement condition looked at more information than those in the low
involvement condition but spent about the same amount of time engaging in information
search behaviors. One possible explanation of these results is that participants were more
familiar with the issue presented in the value-related problem as compared to the other
problems. Recall that this problem depicted a college student who was having trouble
with her roommate using illegal drugs in their dorm room. Thus, the college-student
participants in this study could have related to this problem. If so, they may have engaged
in less information search and were less creative when compared to outcome-involved
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participants. However, this familiarity interpretation does not explain why the valueinvolved participants searched for more information but were less creative when
compared to participants who had a low level of involvement. They searched for more
information, but for some reason, this extra information did not enhance the creativity of
their solutions.
Close-mindedness may be the reason why a fair amount of information search
behaviors did not help participants in the value condition. These participants may have
activated a dominant schema on the value-laden issue after reading the problem and were
convinced immediately as to how the problem should be solved. As a case in point, one
participant reported in his/her solution that the information "looked at was stuff that didn't
really change how I would have [Sally] solve this difficult problem." This is an indication
that participants in the value condition activated a powerful schema on the value issue
and had in their minds from the onset how that issue should be resolved. This may also be
part of the reason why they looked at significantly more information in the same amount
of time when compared to the participants in the low involvement condition. They just
did not extend much cognitive effort towards processing the information presented to
them.
If close-mindedness decreased the motivation of participants to think about the
information they viewed and decreased the creativity of the solution, the question can be
raised as to why they searched for more information than participants in the low
involvement condition? The answer to this question may lie in the distinction between
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biased processing versus amount of processing and whether or not value involvement and
outcome involvement are different constructs. Petty and Cacioppo (1990) speculated that
value involvement was just a high level of involvement that may inhibit persuasion due to
biased processing brought on by a strong, value-laden attitude (as opposed to being a
different involvement construct). However, Maio and Olson (1995) empirically found
that value involvement motivated people to ignore message arguments, not bias them.
They concluded that value involvement is a different construct than outcome involvement
that causes a decrease in the amount of processing by engaging a different aspect of the
self.
Results of the present study seem to show that both biased processing and
decreased processing play a role. A decrease in processing was indicated by the fact that
participants in the high value-involvement condition engaged in less information search
behaviors than those in the high outcome-involvement condition, both in terms of amount
searched and time spent searching. Value-involved participants were also less creative
than their outcome-involved counterparts. These results are consistent with the
interpretations of Maio and Olson (1995) that value involvement decreases the amount of
processing.
However, a decrease in amount of processing does not explain why valueinvolved participants searched for more information but were less creative when
compared to participants with low involvement. This effect may be due to biased
processing in the value-involvement condition. Recall that manipulation check results
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showed that value-involved participants where more involved than low involvement
participants. This is probably why they engaged in more information search behaviors.
However, due to biased processing, this increase in information search did not lead to an
increase in creativity. All the information viewed was immediately assimilated into a
biased attitude or schema. Participants in the value condition believed they knew how this
issue should be solved and the information they viewed did not change this belief.
Therefore, they did not spend as much time contemplating what they selected to view or
spend as much time incorporating what they viewed into their solution.
High value-involvement may have also resulted in participants searching only for
the information that they believed would confirm their biased opinion. Thus, not only
might they have assimilated the searched information into their existing schema, they
might even have attempted to search only for information that was consistent with that
schema or biased opinion. If so, they would not have needed to spend as much time
contemplating that information, which might explain why they did not spend significantly
more time on information search when compared to participants with low involvement,
despite looking at significantly more information. Also, because this information only
served to confirm their opinion, it would not enhance the creativity o f their solutions.
Petty and Cacioppo (1990) reported that value involvement is such a high level of
involvement that it produces inhibiting effects due to biased processing caused by a
strong value-laden attitude. Although biased processing was encountered in the present
study, decreases in processing were also seen and manipulation check results indicated
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that the high outcome-involvement problem was actually more involving than the high
value-involvement problem. Additional analyses using only the few manipulation check
items (five) that dealt specifically with level of general involvement (e.g., "The problem I
worked on was involving") showed that mean involvement in the outcome condition was
3.30, in the value condition it was 2.78, and in the low involvement condition it was 2.68
(measured on a five-point scale with a high score indicating high involvement). Although
not decisive, these results, along with those of Maio and Olson (1995), provide evidence
indicating outcome and value involvement are different constructs affecting different
aspects o f the self and causing differences in cognitive processing.
Need for cognition. The absence of an effect for need for cognition was
unexpected. Cohen et al. (1955) and Cacioppo and Petty (1982) identified the need for
cognition as a stable individual difference in the enjoyment of thinking and the need to
understand everything that is happening. Thus, it seemed that people high in need for
cognition would engage in more information search behaviors and be more creative than
would people low in need for cognition. Similar results have been found in past research
with regards to idea generation (Scudder et al., 1994) and information search behaviors
(Verplanken et al., 1992; Verplanken, 1993).
A couple of different reasons may explain the lack of a need for cognition effect
in the present study. The sample consisted of college students who may tend to be higher
in need for cognition than the general population. This may have resulted in a lack of
sufficient variability. The data show some support for this assertion. The median score on

104

the need for cognition scale was 3.57; the mean was 3.49 and the standard deviation was
.66. The distribution of means on the five point scale was as follows: (a) 2.00% fell
between 1.00 and 2.00, (b) 24.7% fell between 2.01 and 3.00, (c) 52.00% fell between
3.01 and 4.00, and (d) 21.30% fell between 4.01 and 5.00. Although not drastic, these
results indicate that a large majority of participants responded as being high in the need
for cognition. This restriction in range may have played a role in the absence o f need for
cognition effects.
A second reason why null effects were found with need for cognition may be due
to a lack of power. Data from 150 participants may not have been sufficient to reveal
individual differences in need for cognition. Although plausible, this explanation is
unlikely because no trends were found in the data to indicate more power would yield
significant results. All relevant correlations with need for cognition were .08 or smaller.
A third explanation as to why need for cognition was not related to information
search behaviors and creativity may be that the effects o f need for cognition were masked
by other factors in the experiment. One of these factors may have been the nature of the
experimental task. Working on a computer may have been the type of task that naturally
engages most people. Many participants commented that they enjoyed the computer
portion of the experiment. Others mentioned that the computer task was different and
more "fun" than simply filling out questionnaires. Thus, the computer exercise may have
been engaging enough to mask individual differences in need for cognition. However,
this explanation seems unlikely because very few participants (under five) actually
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looked at all the available information, leaving sufficient variability for a potential need
for cognition effect.
The level of difficulty of the high value-involvement problem is a second factor
that may have concealed a need for cognition effect. Past research has indicated that some
participants considered it easy to provide solutions for the high value-involvement and
low involvement problems used in this study (Goodman, 1999; Scherer et al., 1994).
Thus, these problems may not have been difficult enough to challenge those participants
who were high in the need for cognition, thereby not allowing that variable to have an
effect.
A third factor that may have masked a need for cognition effect is the involvement
manipulation. It is possible that each involvement manipulation (outcome and value)
produced such strong reactions that participants' need for cognition no longer mattered.
For example, participants in the outcome-involvement condition may have been so
concerned with the outcome of the problem that participants both low and high in need
for cognition were motivated to engage in extensive information search behaviors and
write creative solutions.
Correlations among need for cognition scores, the information search indicators,
and the creativity indicators within each involvement condition were calculated to
explore this possibility further. These correlations did not reach statistical significance,
probably due to the limited sample size within each condition (n = 50). However, some
trends were present that may partly explain the lack of a need for cognition effect. Within
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the outcome-involvement condition, all correlations were negative and less than -.08,
with the exception of time spent searching, which was -.13. However, within the low
involvement condition, correlations were moderate when considering the information
search behaviors (r = .21 with time spent, r = . 12 with amount searched, and r = .18 with
the composite), but were positive and less than . 11 when looking at the creativity
indicators. Within the value-involvement condition, correlations were positive and less
than .08 with the information search indicators but were moderate when considering the
creativity indicators (r = .14 with originality, r = .20 with appropriateness, and r = .22
with the creativity composite).
These correlations provide some indication that when the data for the three
involvement conditions were aggregated, the effect of need for cognition was lost. The
lack o f correlations with any magnitude in the outcome-involvement condition may
indicate that all participants in this condition were so highly involved that individual
differences in need for cognition did not matter. This is consistent with the speculation by
Cacioppo et al. (1996) that under conditions o f high outcome-involvement a ceiling effect
would be encountered making individual differences in need for cognition irrelevant. In
the low involvement condition, it seems that in terms o f information search behaviors,
participants high in need for cognition were able to overcome the low involvement to
some extent. However, this trend was not seen in the creativity indicators. Finally, the
correlations seem to show that the value-involved participants were able to overcome
their close-mindedness when providing a solution to the value problem; however, these
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trends were not seen with the information search indicators. Thus, although none o f the
correlations were statistically significant, trends provide some evidence that the
involvement manipulation may have played a role in the absence o f a need for cognition
effect.
One must also consider the possibility that the null results found for need for
cognition are true results in this study. There are a number of reasons why this study may
have differed from past research on need for cognition. Much o f the research on need for
cognition has been in the persuasion literature. People high in need for cognition have
been found to engage in more information processing, carefully considering counterattitudinal arguments and other information (Cacioppo et al., 1996). It may be possible
that need for cognition has a stronger effect when looking at argument processing than in
actually searching for information and solving problems. These types o f tasks require
more than just considering message content. Participants must actively engage the
computer and develop a solution to an ill-defined problem.
Verplanken (1993) found results that are similar to those encountered here.
Initially, Verplanken et al. (1992) found that people high in need for cognition desired
more information and used more cognitive effort than those low in need for cognition.
However, participants in this study did not actually search for information; they simply
announced what information they would desire if in that situation. In a follow-up study,
Verplanken (1993) allowed participants to actually search for information. Results
revealed once again that participants high in need for cognition exerted more cognitive
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effort. However, similar to what was found in this study, Verplanken's results revealed
that, when given the opportunity, participants high in need for cognition did not actually
search for more information than those low in need for cognition.
Verplanken (1993) discussed that one o f two things may have explained the lack
o f a need for cognition effect on amount o f information searched. First, he speculated that
the information display board used to guide information search may have resulted in a
ceiling effect in amount o f searchable information. A ceiling effect is not a plausible
explanation in the present study because a large amount of information was provided.
Less than five participants actually viewed every piece of information. Secondly,
Verplanken speculated that identifying the information one would desire to see may be
different than actually searching for that information. He hypothesized that in tasks where
one has to actively search through information, participants high in need for cognition
have alternative routes to satisfy their motivation to engage in thought other than actually
viewing information. They may spend more time on other cognitive activities, such as
processing information, rather then spending more time actually searching for
information.
Verplanken (1993) also discussed that participants in his study who were high in
need for cognition may have engaged in more "intensive" information processing. The
lack o f a relation between need for cognition and time spent searching in the present
study seems to provide evidence against this hypothesis. If participants were engaging in
more "intensive" information processing (and not just searching for more information)
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that effect should have presented itself in the amount of time spent on information search
behaviors. However, there may be other cognitive processes that are related to need for
cognition that did not show up in amount of information searched or amount of time
spent searching, such as speed o f processing.
This same reasoning could also explain the absence of a need for cognition effect
on creative problem solving. Need for cognition may have an effect during an
unmeasured aspect o f creative problem solving, such as problem construction, or
problem-solving confidence. For example, Heppner et al. (1983) found that people who
were more confident in problem solving were also higher in need for cognition. It seems
unlikely that need for cognition would be related to individual processes of creative
problem solving and not the final result (problem solution), but it is a possibility.
Information search behaviors as a mediator. It was predicted that information
search behaviors would mediate the relationship between need for cognition and
creativity and between involvement and creativity. Because no effects were found for
need for cognition, mediation analyses were not preformed with this variable. On the
other hand, type o f involvement was related to information search behaviors and
creativity. Also, information search behaviors predicted creative problem solving.
However, information search behavior was not a mediating variable between involvement
and creativity.
This is an intriguing result. If, as expected, information search behavior is having
the biggest effect during the early stages o f creative problem solving it may be that a
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mediating effect would be found only when considering these early processes. Thus,
information search behavior may show up as a mediator when looking at problem
construction or information encoding. Although type o f involvement was related to
information search behaviors, it is also plausible that these two variables only affect
creativity separately.
Need for cognition / type of involvement interaction. Exploratory hypotheses
predicted that need for cognition would interact with type o f involvement in affecting
information search behavior and creativity. None of the interaction analyses resulted in
statistical significance. Due to the exploratory nature of these predictions, the most
obvious explanation is that these null results are true. However, participants within each
involvement condition did differ in information search behaviors and increases in
information search behaviors were related to increases in creativity across involvement
conditions. Thus, it is worth speculating as to what motivates people to increase
information search behaviors.
Although not significant, it remains possible that need for cognition is that
motivating variable. Graphs of the involvement / need for cognition interaction revealed
that participants in the low involvement and high value-involvement conditions who were
also high in need for cognition did show increases in their information search behaviors
and creativity. This was especially evident for the value-involved participants when
considering the creativity composite scores. Therefore, it is possible that people high in
need for cognition are able to overcome the close-mindedness brought on by the value
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issue and are able to overcome the low motivation brought on by the low involvement
issue. These trends seem to reveal a possible benefit for people high in need for
cognition. It should be reiterated, however, that these predictions were exploratory and
the null findings remain the most plausible interpretation of the results.
Implications o f Results
Applied implications. Increasing the creativity o f employees is becoming very
important to employers in today's rapidly changing, information technology-based work
environment. Many times these changes require creative solutions to ill-defined, novel
problems. One option for organizations who desire these creative solutions is to hire
employees with creative potential. However, this is not usually a practical solution. A
second and more immediate option is to maximize or capitalize on the creative potential
of current employees. This has recently become a very viable option as researchers have
begun to demonstrate that all people have the potential to be creative (Houtz, 1994;
Runco & Chand, 1994; Treffinger et al., 1994). Research has also indicated that leaders
or managers can tap that potential and increase the creativity o f their employees
(Redmond et al. 1993). Given that all people have a certain degree of creative potential, it
becomes evident that the ability to tap into that potential is competitively advantageous
for organizations.
The present study provides empirical support for the assertion that increases in
information search behaviors will be accompanied by increases in creativity. Participants
who searched and viewed more information and spent more time on information search
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behaviors were more creative. This finding alone has applied implications. First,
employers need to make relevant information available to employees who are working to
solve a problem. All employees, and especially managers will encounter novel problems,
issues, and crises while on the job. If these employees are unable to attain the information
they need to solve these problems, the creativity of their solutions will suffer and the
problems, issues, or crises will not be solved optimally. The more information available
to employees the greater the possibility that they will have the information they need to
creatively solve a problem.
The second implication o f this information search finding is that people need time
to engage in information search behaviors and solve a problem creatively. Participants
who spent more time engaging in information search behaviors were more creative. The
first step in helping to ensure employees spend the time needed to engage in information
search behaviors is to make that time available. Although this is not always an option for
organizations, the results of this study indicate that managers and employees are more
likely to be creative if they dedicate time towards information search behaviors. In order
to dedicate that time, these employees must feel that they have this time available to them
above and beyond their other duties. This explanation is consistent with Mumford,
Whetzel, and Reiter-Palmon (1997) who discussed the importance o f information
gathering to organizational problems and how time pressure, limited access to important
information, etc., will hinder the creativity o f employees.
Opportunity to search for more information and extra time to engage in
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information search behaviors alone are probably not sufficient to consistently enhance
creativity. Most people need motivation to engage in the extended information search
needed to see creative results. The present study reveals that personal involvement may
be a way in which organizations can provide this motivation. However, a general increase
in task or problem involvement alone is not sufficient. Advantages and disadvantages are
found depending on the type of personal involvement felt by employees. Outcome
involvement provides motivation above and beyond regular levels o f involvement. Value
involvement, on the other, is detrimental in that people are even less creative than normal.
The most important applied implication of the involvement results is that
organizations will benefit by making the outcomes of employees' problem solving efforts
highly relevant to them while avoiding engaging their values and morals. Participants in
this study engaged in extended information search behaviors and were more creative if
they had a stake in the outcome of the problem. In other words, if they believed that the
outcome of their problem-solving efforts would or could affect them in some manner,
they were motivated to engage in information search behaviors and develop a creative
solution to the problem. This finding has the potential to be very influential in terms of
increasing employee creativity. If managers can discover how to increase the personal
relevance o f organizational outcomes so that employees become highly involved while
working towards those outcomes, it may provide employees with the increased motivated
needed for creative results to be realized.
A second important finding concerns the detrimental effects of high value
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involvement in terms of creativity. Participants in the high value-involvement condition
engaged in more information search behaviors than participants in the low involvement
condition but were less creative. Implications of this finding are fairly obvious.
Executives and managers must be careful not to engage employees' values and morals in
a problem-solving effort. The difficulty with this will be to identify before hand which
issues or problems have the potential to affect employees' values. These issues could
include pay raises, promotions, or other areas that may tap into organizational justice
issues. This also could include any issues that are related to company politics, which
always have the potential to affect employee values (Ferris & King, 1991). Generally,
there is a potential that employees will become value-involved any time they get too
emotionally attached to a problem or solution.
Theoretical implications. The research findings o f the present study provide
indirect empirical support for the creativity model developed by Mumford et al. (1991).
Increases in information search behaviors engaged in before providing a solution to a
problem were accompanied by increases in the creativity o f problem solutions. Mumford
et al. (1991) emphasized with their model the importance of the early stages of creative
problem solving when a person develops a plan for solving a problem and collects the
information they will need to complete this plan successfully. Although this study did not
directly measure the specific processes involved in the early stages o f creative problem
solving, one can infer that participants who searched for more information and spent
more time on information search behaviors also spent more time on problem construction
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and information encoding because these early stages are where information search
behaviors are most required. In any case, the results provide additional empirical support
for the importance o f information search behaviors to creative problem solving.
A second theoretical implication is that this research is one o f the first studies to
look at type of personal involvement in an area other than persuasion. Extending this
research into information search behaviors and creative problem solving helps to
strengthen the results found in the persuasion literature. Although research exists that
explores the effects o f general involvement on information search behaviors and problem
solving, none o f these studies considered the different effects o f value versus outcome
involvement. This study indicates that it may be critical to account for the differences
between these two types of involvement, as first indicated by Johnson and Eagly (1989).
Outcome involvement not only increases message processing but also increases
information search behaviors and creativity. On the other hand, although value
involvement has positive effects on information search behaviors (though not to the
extent o f outcome involvement) it proves to be detrimental to creative problem solving.
The close-mindedness and inhibiting effects o f value involvement discussed by Johnson
and Eagly in terms o f persuasion also seems to be true in creative problem solving. These
results provide an indication that the effects of motivation due to personal involvement
may present themselves in many different arenas
Limitations and Future Research.
Methodological limitations. This research study contains several methodological
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limitations that should be improved upon or corrected by future research. One such
limitation is that the data did not provide information on the thought process o f those
searching for information. Recall that participants worked alone in a small room. Thus, it
is unknown, for example, whether or not some participants wasted time on peripheral
behaviors unrelated to information search behaviors. Future research might be able to use
verbal protocols or a related method to examine more closely the actual thought processes
o f participants engaging in information search behaviors. Along the same lines, future
research should also attempt to use more sensitive measures of time spent on information
search. For example, obtaining a measure of time spent on each item searched might
prove informative. Certain people may spend more time contemplating each item
searched whereas others may scroll through many items just to get an overview of the
issues, and then spend time contemplating this information while they are developing
their solutions. The measures used in this study were not sensitive enough to capture
either o f these possibilities.
A second limitation that should be improved upon concerns the problems
participants in this study were asked to solve. Separate problems depicting different
issues were used for each involvement condition. This presents a possible confounding
variable. Observed involvement difference could have been due to the problem itself,
rather than the type o f involvement it produced. For example, a problem, by its nature
alone, may immediately present more possible solutions, regardless o f the level of
involvement it induces (Scherer, 1989; Scherer et al., 1994). Although the assertion that
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value involvement and outcome involvement are different theoretical constructs
necessitates that they be addressed by different problems, it is conceivable that an issue
could be developed where minor changes in the problem could make it an outcome- or
value-involvement problem. This would greatly reduce the possibility that any observed
differences are due to aspects o f the problem other than personal involvement.
Another limitation o f this study was the order in which data were collected.
Because of unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances, a large portion o f the data for the
low involvement condition were collected with students enrolled in summer classes
whereas the data for the outcome- and value-involvement conditions were collected from
students enrolled in fall classes. However, there does not seem to be a reason to believe
students who take classes during the summer are in any way different than students who
take classes during the regular semesters. The only conceivable difference may be that
students who take classes during the summer are more conscientious and motivated than
students who take the summer off and only enroll in the fall and spring semesters. In that
case, results would only be strengthened because the summer students received the low
involvement problem.
Theoretical limitations and future directions. This study provides further
explanations about the importance o f information search behaviors in the creative
process. However, this study did not explore where in the creative process these variables
have their effects. For example, it was speculated that information search behaviors
would have their greatest impact during the early stages of creative problem solving,
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specifically between the problem construction and information encoding stages. Future
research should specifically test this proposition. Mumford et al. (1994) reported that
during problem construction people develop an execution plan for solving a problem.
This plan lays the foundation for information search behaviors. Thus, effective problem
construction should lead to productive information search behaviors, which in turn should
lead to more information being encoded, etc. Future research should attempt to
empirically support this assertion.
Future research should also explore further the effects o f type o f involvement.
More research is needed to determine if value involvement and outcome involvement
should be considered different constructs. This research should continue in the persuasion
arena along with other areas such as creativity and decision making. If results continue to
be found within and outside the persuasion literature, more confidence can be applied to
the proposed theoretical assertions.
Future research also needs to examine the specific differences in information
search behaviors between the different types o f involvement. For example, are there
differences in the content of the information people search for depending on the type of
involvement? Do people who have their values and morals engaged look only for
information that supports their opinion? People seem to be close-minded on value-related
issues and it is plausible that this close-mindedness would motivate them to look at only
the information they feel would support this close-minded opinion or attitude. In the same
manner, studies need to address whether people who are outcome-involved simply
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engage in more information search or if they also search for higher quality information
and/or think more deeply about the information they retrieve. There are a wealth of
available research questions that could be addressed by looking more in-depth at the type
of information people search for in each of the involvement conditions.
Future research also needs to explore whether the inhibiting effects o f value
involvement are due to decreases in information processing, biased processing or both.
Also, if the answer is both, as this study seems to indicate, is one more influential? Along
the same lines, research needs to explore what can reduce or overcome the detrimental
effects o f value involvement. If possible, studies should determine how to reliably reduce
the close-mindedness that seems to occur when people have their values and morals
engaged. This will also have important applied implications. If managers can determine
how to reduce value-involvement effects they should be able to increase the creativity of
solutions to value-laden problems.
Along similar lines, research should look more closely at values themselves. This
study found that value-relevant issues are detrimental to creative problems solving.
However, to make a general prescription to avoid value-laden topics is probably not
desired or practical. It is very likely that the detrimental affects found in this study will
depend on the problem being solved and which values the issue depicted in that problem
violates or makes salient. An individual's value system, including both its content and
structure, probably also play a role in determining which issues have the potential to
hinder creative problem solving. Thus, a more complete understand of how and why high
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value involvement hinders creativity could be obtained by looking more directly at the
value component itself.
Another possibility for future research is to ascertain what makes people search
for more information regardless of type of involvement. Although people differed in
terms of information search behaviors between each involvement condition, they also
differed greatly within each condition. Because of this, and because information search
behaviors are positively related to creativity, determining why certain people engage in
extended information search behaviors, regardless of personal involvement, will have
obvious beneficial implications. The present study found that need for cognition does not
seem to be this variable. Future research should consider other individual difference
variables as possibilities, such as need for closure or intrinsic motivation.
However, future research should not ignore the need for cognition as an important
variable in predicting information search behaviors and creativity. The theoretical
reasoning and empirical evidence in support of this variable being positively related to
information search and creativity are still stronger than those against. Also, future
research should again consider a need for cognition / involvement interaction. Although
not statistically significant, trends in the present data indicated that people in the low and
high value-involvement conditions who were high need for cognition were motivated to
search for more information and were more creative than those low in need for cognition.
Future research should explore this further.
Future applied research directions. Several promising applied research avenues
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are also bom out of the present study. First, this study's findings need to be replicated in
an applied setting to determine if the effects o f type o f involvement generalize to
problems encountered by organizations. Secondly, studies should examine the type of
involvement brought on by different types of organizational problems. For example,
researchers should investigate what issues have the potential to engage employee values
and morals and if there are ways to avoid this from happening. Similarly, research should
determine what managers and executives can do to make organizational problems
personally relevant to individual employees so that these employees will have a high
level of outcome involvement.
One o f the more difficult tasks in an organizational setting may turn out to be
getting employees outcome-involved without engaging their values. Values comprise part
of an individual's stable characteristics (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989; Rokeach,
1973) and will invariably play a role in most activities that person engages in. These
activities include those performed on a job. Values play a role in employee behavior,
satisfaction, and commitment (Meglino et al., 1989). Therefore, most organizational
problems will be value-related to some extent. Future research should investigate this
value versus outcome dilemma in organizational problems to determine how to achieve
outcome involvement while repressing value involvement.
Conclusions
The results of this study indicate that organizations may have the potential to
enhance the creativity of their employees through two main avenues. First, it was shown
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that increases in amount of information searched and amount o f time spent searching lead
to increases in creativity. Thus, organizations should ensure that the information desired
by employees is available to them and ensure that these employees have time to search
for and consider this information. Second, results revealed that creativity is enhanced
through high participant involvement due to the personal relevancy o f a problem's
outcome. Thus, organizations can enhance employee creativity by increasing the personal
relevance and importance o f organizational outcomes. However, organizations must also
ensure that organizational problems do not engage employees' values and morals in order
to avoid the detrimental effects high value involvement has on creative problem solving.
Clearly the involvement results found in this study have important implications for
organizational problem solving. Personal involvement has both the potential to benefit
and hinder organizations and further research directed at understanding these effects in
work settings has the potential to be very influential in determining the optimal
circumstances for employee participation in organizational problem solving.
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Appendix A
The Need for Cognition Scale
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is
characteristic o f you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic o f you (not at all like
you) please place a “ 1” on the line to the left of the statement; if the statement is
extremely characteristic o f you (very much like you) please place a “5” on the line to the
left o f the statement. You should use the following scale as you rate each o f the
statements below.
1

Extremely Uncharacteristic

2

Somewhat Uncharacteristic

3

Uncertain

4

Somewhat Characteristic

5

Extremely Characteristic

1.

I prefer complex to simple problems.

2.

I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of
thinking.

3.
4.

Thinking is not my idea o f fun.
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something
that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.

5.

I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will
have to think in depth about something.
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6.

I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours.

7.

I only think as hard as I have to.

8.

I prefer to think about small daily projects to long-term ones.

9.

I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.

10.

The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.

11.

I really enjoy tasks that involve coming up with new solutions to
problems.

12.

Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me much.

13.

I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.

14.

The notion o f thinking abstractly is appealing to me.

15.

I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that
is somewhat important but does not require much thought.

16.

I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a
lot o f mental effort.

17.

It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or
why it works.

18.

I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me
personally.
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Appendix B
Sally's Problem

Sally is a new student at a small liberal arts college. She moved into a dormitory
at the beginning o f the school year and was assigned to a roommate, Jackie. Jackie is very
popular with the other students. Sally also likes Jackie, but she does not like sharing a
room with her. The problem is that Jackie smokes marijuana in the room a couple of
times a week. Sally strongly disapproves of drugs o f any kind because she has had a close
family member pass away due to a drug overdose. She feels very uncomfortable when
Jackie is smoking in the room, and is concerned that her parents would be upset if they
found out what was happening. Furthermore, she does not like Jackie's behavior when she
gets high; at these times, Jackie tends to be obnoxious and inconsiderate. This is Sally's
first experience with drug use since coming to college and she does not know what to do.
She is rather timid, and prefers to avoid trouble whenever possible. Also, Jackie doesn't
seem to notice that Sally is concerned about the situation (even though she knows about
Sally's family history with drugs). Sally also realizes that Jackie is very popular with the
other students in her dorm, and, being that she is a new college student, she (Sally) is
worried about their reactions to any action she may take. However, she is afraid that
things with Jackie will get worse as the term proceeds. What should Sally do?
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Appendix C
Exam Problem

For the past five years, UNO has been concerned about the quality of education
students possess when they leave the University. Many professors have expressed a
concern that the students may not be prepared when leaving the University and starting a
new job. UNO realizes that how former students perform on their jobs reflects the quality
o f education they received while at UNO. UNO administrators do not know if these
concerns are warranted or are people's opinions. However, they would like to assess the
situation. In order to do this they need a way of assessing the education students have
when leaving UNO. It has recently come to the attention of UNO that many colleges and
universities are starting to require students to pass comprehensive examinations before
graduating. Although these comprehensive exams are quite long and challenging,
administrators believe that they will be a good way of assessing any deficiencies
graduates have when they leave. This information will then be utilized to improve on
required courses. It will also be used to require students who do not pass this exam to
take additional classes before graduating to better prepare them for the "real-world".
UNO is not sure how students will react to this solution, but are having difficulty thinking
of any alternative solutions. Therefore, they are opening up the issue to the students in an
effort to help generate other solutions to this problem. Can you help UNO with their
problem of assessing the quality o f education obtained by graduates? Please write your
solution below.
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Appendix D
Sam's Problem

Sam is a technician in a large pest control company. Each week, Sam provides
pest control assessments and treatments for several dozen regular accounts in his territory
and handles any "spot jobs" that come up if he has enough time. Sam enjoys his work
because the hours are flexible and he is his own boss. In addition, the pay is commissionbased and because Sam is an excellent technician, he makes good money. On the other
hand, Sam believes that the work can be dangerous because it calls for lifting and
carrying heavy equipment without assistance. Many technicians in the company have had
shoulder and back injuries as a result of such strenuous job demands. In the past few
months, Sam's family has had additional expenses that Sam's regular workload cannot
cover. Sam is working harder and faster, but the depressed economy has made "spot jobs"
scarce and has removed any hope of finding a higher paying job elsewhere. Recently,
Sam was offered a "spot job" that would pay enough to cover several overdue bills, but
would involve a great deal of highly strenuous lifting, carrying and maneuvering of
equipment and supplies. Sam needs the money that this job would provide; however, he
is afraid of the considerable personal risk. Sam does not know what to do; can you offer a
solution to his problem?
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Appendix E
Mark's Problem

Mark is a senior in college and captain o f the swim team. The team is at the state
swim meet, which is being held at another college. This is Mark's first overnight trip as
captain of the team. The team consists o f ten other swimmers and the coach. The coach
has made it clear that as the captain, Mark is responsible for the behavior o f the whole
team. Mark found out that several team members are planning to sneak out of the dorm
after curfew and meet with members of some o f the other teams to go out to the bars.
Mark's best friend seems to be the one organizing this night out, and he is generally a
reliable person and does not get into trouble. Mark knows that the rules o f the swim meet,
as well as the rules o f the team, prohibit leaving the dorm after curfew. The team could be
disqualified from the meet if the officials find out. Mark has been excited to have the
people at the meet see how good their team is this year. However, he is worried about
how well the team will perform in the meet tomorrow if they go out drinking tonight. If
the coach finds out about this, the organizer o f the outing, Mark's best friend and one of
the best swimmers on the team, will be suspended from the team for this meet. Mark, as
captain of the team, would also be suspended from the meet and would lose his position
as captain for the remainder o f the season. Mark wants to keep his best friend and the rest
of the team members happy as well as the coach and the swim meet officers. What should
Mark do?
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Appendix F
Night Classes Problem
The issue o f whether or not UNO should hold night classes has been debated on
campus for a couple o f years now. Enrollment in night classes is very small (sometimes
only five people per class). The University has disclosed that it is losing money on these
night classes. It costs more to light and power the classrooms and buildings and to staff
the needed University personnel (including professors, support staff, security, etc.) than
what the University makes in tuition from the students enrolled in these classes. UNO has
also received several letters from distinguished faculty members who are not fond of
teaching after 6:00 p.m. On the other side of the issue, UNO would like to be an “equal
opportunity” university. This means that night classes are needed to accommodate the
non-traditional students who work during the day. Secondly, most of the classrooms are
already scheduled during the day leaving little space to add the classes that would be
moving from the night schedule. UNO does not know what to do. Please help with this
issue by offering any possible solutions to this problem. Your responses will be compiled
with those o f other participants and then will be given to UNO officials for consideration,
therefore, all participants will remain anonymous.
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Appendix G
Barb's Problem

Barb is a nurse at a hospital and was elected by other nurses to represent them on
the hospital's governing board. At a recent board meeting, some hospital administrators
discussed closing the children's intensive care unit. Although the hospital has not lost a
lot o f money operating the unit, administrators forecast that the unit could use up more of
the hospital's financial resources in the future. Administrators also feel that the money
freed up from closing this unit could be used for future improvements so that the hospital
can continue to offer excellent adult care. The hospital has been operating the unit as a
service to the community and Barb realizes that many nurses would lose their jobs if the
hospital eliminates the children's intensive care unit. Barb believes that if enough people
objected to the plan, the board might respond favorably and try to accommodate their
needs. Barb would like to speak with some other nurses about this, but she is expected to
keep the information confidential. In addition, she does not want to jeopardize her
position on the board. Barb does not know what to do.
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Appendix H
Involvement Manipulation Check Questions
Items used to check for low involvement:
1.

The problem made me feel angry.

2.

The issue that the problem presented was related to my values and morals.

3.

The outcome of the problem is very relevant to me.

4.

I am not concerned with this problem.

5.

The problem presented a major social issue.

6.

I was personally involved while working on this problem.

7.

The problem did not produce an emotional reaction for me.

8.

The outcome of the problem is very important to me.

9.

This problem has no immediate effect on me.

10.

The issue depicted in this problem is very important to me.

11.

The issue presented in the problem is related to my values and morals.

12.

The issue in the problem violated established social values.

13.

The issue presented in this problem activated a well-established attitude in me.

14.

The outcome of the problem will personally affect me.

15.

The problem I worked on was involving.

16.

The problem strongly affected me personally.

17.

The problem matters a lot to me.

18.

The problem provoked strong feelings in me.
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19.

The consequences of this problem may affect me in some manner.

Items used to check high outcome involvement:
1.

The problem made me feel angry.

2.

The outcome o f the problem is very relevant to me.

3.

I am not concerned with this problem.

4.

I was personally involved while working on this problem.

5.

The outcome o f the problem is very important to me.

6.

This problem has no immediate effect on me.

7.

The issue depicted in this problem is very important to me.

8.

The outcome of the problem will personally affect me.

9.

The problem I worked on was involving.

10.

The problem matters a lot to me.

11.

The consequences o f this problem may affect me in some manner.

Items used to check high value involvement:
1.

The problem made me feel angry.

2.

The issue that the problem presented was related to my values and morals.

3.

I am not concerned with this problem.

4.

The problem presented a major social issue.

5.

I was personally involved while working on this problem.
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6.

The problem did not produce an emotional reaction for me.

7.

The issue presented in the problem is related to my values and morals.

8.

The issue in the problem violated established social values.

9.

The issue presented in this problem activated a well-established attitude in me.

10.

The problem I worked on was involving.

11.

The problem strongly affected me personally.

12.

The problem matters a lot to me.

13.

The problem provoked strong feelings in me.

Items used to check for differentiation between high value involvement and high outcome
involvement:
1.

The issue that the problem presented was related to my values and morals.

2.

The outcome of the problem is very relevant to me.

3.

The problem presented a major social issue.

4.

The issue described in the problem presented is not acceptable in today’s society.

5.

The outcome of the problem is very important to me.

6.

This problem has no immediate effect on me.

7.

The issue presented in the problem is related to my values and morals.

8.

The issue in the problem violated established social values.

9.

The outcome o f the problem will personally affect me.

10.

The consequences o f this problem may affect me in some manner.
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Appendix I
Instructions to Pilot Study Participants
Imagine you were presented with this problem and were asked to offer a solution.
In order to generate a well thought out, complete solution you would probably desire
more information than that given in the problem. We are interested in what additional
information would be beneficial to you if you were asked to solve this problem. We are
not asking you to give a solution to the problem. Please answer the questions below.
1.

Assuming you have an opinion about how the problem should be solved, what

additional information would you need to confirm your opinion, or what information
would help you present the solution you think is correct?
2.

What additional information could be requested that would not support or confirm

your opinion about how the problem should be solved?
3.

Please list any additional information that would help solve the problem, or if you

don't have an opinion about how the problem should be solved, list below any
information that you feel would be beneficial in solving the problem.
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Appendix J
Searchable Information for Sally's Problem
1. Personal information about Sally and Jackie
A. Information about Sally's life
1.

Does Sally have a good social support system?
- Sally has some really close friends from high school but she does
not see them much now that she has gone away to college. She has
not made any close friends at college.

2.

How old is Sally?
- Sally is 19 years old.

3.

What kind of grades does Sally obtain?
- Sally's GPA was 3.45 in high school.

4.

What is Sally's current education level?
- Sally is a first year college student.

5.

Has Sally ever tried any type o f illegal drug?
- No, Sally has never tried an illegal drug.

B. Information about Sally's views and personality.
1.

Is Sally the type of person to put herself on the line if Jackie gets
caught?
- Sally would probably tell them what she needs to in order to clear
herself but would be hesitant to make accusations about Jackie.
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2.

Is Sally the type of person to talk openly to others about this issue?
- Sally would only feel comfortable talking to close family
members and close friends.

3.

Does Sally care what others think o f her?
- Sally likes having a lot of friends. Therefore, she is concerned
about the image she portrays. This is especially the case now that
she is a first-year college student around many new people.

4.

Why does Sally not do drugs?
- Sally feels that drugs will only serve to mess-up her life. Due to
the past experience o f having a family member addicted, she
knows about the negative consequences o f using drugs.

C. Information about Jackie's life
1.

Has Jackie ever done other drugs?
- She tried cocaine once at a party a few weeks ago.

2.

How long has Jackie smoked marijuana?
- Jackie has smoked marijuana for about two years.

3.

How old is Jackie?
- Jackie is 20 years old.

4.

What kind of grades does Jackie obtain?
- Jackie's high school GPA was 3.50.

5.

What is Jackie's current education level?
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- Jackie is a first year college student.
D. Information about Jackie's views and personality
1.

How does Jackie feel about how others view her?
- Jackie has always been her own person and is not very concerned
about what others think o f her.

2.

Why does Jackie smoke marijuana?
- Jackie smokes marijuana because she likes the way she feels
when she is high.

3.

How is Jackie's self-image?
- Jackie has a positive self-image and is very comfortable with her
life.

4.

Is Jackie open to the views of others?
- Jackie is very open and respectful to the views o f others.
However, she does not let the views of others change her own
personal views.

2. Information about Sally and Jackie's relationship with each other.
A. Information about their regular, everyday relationship
1.

How often do Sally and Jackie talk with each other one on one?
- Other than the daily "hello" and "how are you doing"
conversations, Sally and Jackie do not talk very often. When they
do, the conversations usually do not involve personal issues.

151

2.

Do Sally and Jackie spend a lot of time together?
-

Sally and Jackie do many things with other students in their

dorm. They do not often do things that involve just the two of
them.
3.

Does Jackie know about Sally's family member who died o f a drug
overdose?
- Yes, Jackie knows about Sally's family member who died of a
drug overdose.

B. Information about their relationship when Jackie is high.
1.

Does Jackie realize how she behaves when high?
- Jackie believes she is more fun when she is high because she
feels more relaxed and outgoing.

2.

Does Jackie usually smoke when Sally is around?
- Because Jackie smokes at night and on weekends, Sally is usually
present in the room.

3.

Is Jackie ever violent with Sally when she is high?
- Up to this point, Jackie has not been physically violent with
Sally. However, she is verbally inconsiderate and at times, very
insulting.

3. Relationships
A. Information about Sally's family
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1.

What drug did Sally’s family member overdose on?
- Sally's family member overdosed on cocaine.

2.

How long ago did Sally's family member die of an overdose?
- Sally's family member overdosed 2 years ago.

3.

How would Sally's parents react if they knew about Jackie?
- Sally's parents would be very angry and would go directly to
school officials if they found out Jackie smokes marijuana.

4.

What do Sally's parents think of Jackie?
- Sally's parents have only met Jackie twice. However, both times
they were very impressed with how outgoing and friendly Jackie
was.

5.

Where do Sally's parents live?
- Sally parents live in Minneapolis, MN.

B. Information about Jackie's family
1.

Where do Jackie's parents live?
- Jackie's parents live in New York City.

2.

Does Jackie's family have a history with drugs?
- Jackie's family does not have a "history" of drugs. However, both
her mother and father smoked marijuana when they were younger.

3.

What do Jackie's parents think about Sally?
- Jackie's parent think Sally is very nice and friendly.
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4.

How do Jackie's parents feel about illegal drugs?
- Jackie's parents disapprove o f all illegal drugs.

5.

Do Jackie's parents know she smokes marijuana?
- Jackie's parents do not know she smokes marijuana.

C. Information about their friends
1.

Do Jackie and Sally have any common friends?
- Both Jackie and Sally are friends with most o f the people on their
dorm floor. They do not have common friends outside of college.

2.

What do Jackie's friends think about Sally?
- Jackie's friends outside of college think Sally is very friendly,
however, they also feel she is too conservative.

3.

What do Sally's friends think about Jackie?
- Sally's friends who do not know Jackie smokes marijuana like her
a lot. Those who do know she smokes marijuana do not care for
her because they know Sally is having a rough time with it.

4.

Do Jackie's friends smoke marijuana also?
- Only a few a Jackie's friends smoke marijuana.

5.

Do any of Sally's friends use drugs?
- As far as Sally knows, none o f her friends use illegal drugs.

4. Information about their university.
A. Information about the university drug policy
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1.

What are the required actions that should be taken if a student has
knowledge of drug use?
- Students who have knowledge of drug activity on campus are
asked to report it to campus security.

2.

Does the school have a no smoking and anti-drug policy in dorms?
Students are prohibited from using illegal drug anywhere on
campus. 60% of dorm rooms are no smoking rooms.

3.

What is the policy of the school for possession of drugs on
campus?
- According to school policy, those found in possession of illegal
drugs will be turned over to the state police for prosecution and
will be expelled from school pending the outcome o f the
investigation.

4.

When were the drug policies last revised?
- The university drug policies were reviewed two years ago.

B. Information about the university policy regarding altering campus living
arrangements.
1.

Can first-year students live in an apartment off-campus?
- First-year students are required to live on-campus.

2.

Are there other rooms available?
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- Dorm rooms are always filled each semester, but students do quit
school or move off-campus every now and then opening up a room
during the semester,
3.

How does the university feel about altering living arrangements?
- The College discourages students from changing rooms. They
prefer students attempt to work out differences rather than having
students change rooms throughout the year.

4.

How difficult would it be to find a new roommate?
- Students usually get along with their roommates and are not
interested in changing rooms. Therefore, it is usually difficult to
find someone willing to move and change roommates.

C. University demographics
1.

Where in the U.S. is the school located?
- Sally and Jackie attend a university in the Southeastern United
States.

2.

How large is the school Sally and Jackie attend?
- There are 8000 enrolled students at this university.

3.

How large is the city where the school is located?
- The college is located in a city o f about 400,000 people.

4.

Is the university public or private?
The university Sally and Jackie attend is a public institution.
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Appendix K
Searchable Information for the Exam Problem
1. Information on the actual exam.
A. Information on the content o f the exam
1.

How many questions are on the exam?
- 500 questions

2.

What format will the exam questions be in?
- The exam questions will be multiple choice.

3.

Will the exam concentrate on the individual's area o f study?
- 1/4 of the exam will be in area of concentration.

4.

How long will it take to complete the exam?
- The exam will take approximately four hours.

5.

What content areas will the exam cover?
- The test has four parts - Math, Verbal, Analytical, and content
specific (major area).

B. Information on the preparation and administration o f the exam.
1.

Will there be classes or other materials to help the student prepare
for this exam?
- Approximately one month before the test there will be a two-hour
preparation class.

2.

Who would administer the exam?
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- Each college would administer the exam to their students.
3.

During what part of the academic year will the test be given?
- The test will be given in October o f every year.

4.

What is the first semester in which the exam can be taken?
- The test may be taken as soon as the student has senior status.

C. Information on other schools using comprehensive exams
1.

Are most students at other schools well prepared for the exam?
- Surveys have shown that 80% o f students feel they are prepared
for the exam.

2.

Does the exam have an affect on the number o f students who
graduated?
- 15% do not graduate due to not passing the exam. However, 95%
of these students pass the test on subsequent tries.

3.

How are the UNO graduates doing compared to other schools
graduates?
- Average GPA is pretty much the same across schools.

4.

How did these exams affect the enrollment o f those schools who
use them?
- On average, enrollment dropped 5%, but this does not seem to be
specific to those schools using the comprehensive exam.

5.

How many other schools are using this exam?

158

- Approximately 10% o f state institutions are using a
comprehensive exam.
D. Information on implications o f the exam.
1.

Is UNO willing to give out more financial aid to those students
who fail the exam and have to take more classes?
- The financial aid process will not change.

2.

Who would pay for the extra classes that UNO has to offer to those
who don't pass the exam?
- Classes other than those already offered are not needed to pass
the exam.

3.

What if the part o f the test failed has no relevance to the
individual's major?
- The parts of the exam not passed, regardless of what they are,
will need to be retaken the following year.

4.

What exactly happens if a student does not pass the exam?
- The student will have to retake the parts failed the following year.

2. Relevant UNO statistics
A. Pre-graduation information
1.

What percentage of UNO students is not passing courses?
- Around 5% o f students do not pass in an introductory course.
This number is reduced for higher level courses.
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2.

How many UNO students withdraw from classes?
- Around 10% - 15% of students withdraw from introductory
courses. This number is reduced for higher level courses.

3.

Are most students expected to be well prepared for the exam?
- Students should have obtained sufficient knowledge to pass.

B. Post-graduation information
1.

Where do the majority of students work once they have graduated?
- The highest percentage of students is entering business or
governmental jobs.

2.

What are the average grades of those who graduate?
- The average GPA o f graduates is 2.95

3.

What percent o f students enter the work force right after
graduation?
- 75% o f students look to enter the work force after graduation.

3. Information on the problem
A. Information on UNO's problem-solving process
1.

What exactly does UNO hope to achieve by these tests?
- To ensure students are well educated in the fundamentals.

2.

Could a trial period be used to see if the test works?
- The test is identical to those used and validated by other schools
so a trial period is not necessary.
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3.

Is the problem finding out whether or not graduates are deficient or
correcting these proficiencies?
- At this point, the main concern is assessing the extent of the
deficiency.

4.

Whose idea was this test?
- The idea originated with top UNO administrators.

5.

Was there ever a vote on the issue?
- The Regents and College Deans voted to consider the issue.

B. Information on how the problem was diagnosed
1.

What evidence are the professors using in regards to the
preparedness o f former students?
- Professors have reported hearing comments about this issue from
friends and colleagues in the real world. They also feel that
students seem to be lacking fundamental mathematical and verbal
skills.

2.

Are students knowledgeable in their major fields?
- From what can be determined, students are knowledgeable in
their area of concentration. The exam will shed additional light on
this matter.

3.

Is UNO receiving feedback from employers or students regarding
this issue?

161

- The input from both employers and students is being considered.
4.

What caused the administrators to wonder about the quality of
education that students had when graduating from the UNO?
- There has been an increasing pressure from faculty concerning
this issue over the past 5-7 years. Also, employers report that a
major training cost is teaching verbal and mathematical skills.

5.

What do employers think graduates should possess in “real-world”
skills?
- Employers report that fundamental verbal and mathematical skills
are as important as specific area knowledge in today's economy.

C. Information on surrounding issues.
1.

Could classes be changed to see if the problem could besolved that
way?
- This would not assess the magnitude o f the education deficiency.

2.

Are internships integrated into the curriculum?
- An internship is an option that all students can pursue if
interested.

3.

Could there be a GPA cutoff for the comprehensive exam so those
with a high GPA would not have to take the exam?
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- Students can perform well in their major area o f emphasis and
still not know some education fundamentals. Also, an objective
way of selecting this cutoff cannot be determined.
4.

Will this problem go away if students are allowed to take only
classes in their major because that is what their work will be in?
- This does not address the problem of students not mastering their
verbal or mathematical skills.

5.

Could the quality o f the professor be the cause o f the problem?
- This would need to be assessed after the magnitude o f the
educational deficiency is determined.

4. Information on reactions to the exam idea.
A. Information on student's reactions
1.

How do UNO students feel about their education?
- UNO students who were interviewed feel they are receiving a
quality education.

2.

What are the emotions or feelings o f the UNO students about the
exam?
- Most UNO students interviewed are not thrilled about the
possibility of not graduating due to the result o f a comprehensive
exam.
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3.

Do UNO students feel they are not qualified for the workforce
when they graduate?
- Students feel they are qualified in their area of concentration.

4.

What is the reaction o f students at the schools who are currently
using the exam?
- These students do not look forward to taking the exam, but feel
they are more concerned with learning because o f it.

B. Information on professor's and administrator's reactions
1.

What do UNO professors think about this idea?
- The reactions of UNO professors to the comprehensive exam idea
have been largely positive.

2.

What do UNO administrators think about this idea?
- All administrators spoken to strongly endorse the idea of
requiring an exam.

3.

Do professors feel this issue is an indication o f their teaching
effectiveness?
- Most professors feel that they do not have the opportunity in a
specialized cl ass to assess all areas of a students education, and
therefore feel a comprehensive exam should be used to make this
assessment.
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4.

Are the administrators concerned about the cost o f administering
the exam?
- Administrators expect that in the long run, the test will increase
the quality o f education obtained by the average UNO graduate.
This will result in graduates achieving better jobs, which will help
UNO recruit high quality students in the future.

C. Information on employer's reactions
1.

How have employers been reacting to the exam idea?
- The employers interviewed had either positive or neutral
reactions, with the majority being positive.

2.

Do employers feel the exam will address the issue?
- Employers are unsure if the exam will address the deficiency
issue but applaud UNO for attempting to do something.

3.

Do employers who have hired students from universities that
require the exam feel it is beneficial?
- Most employers do not know whether their employees have taken
the exam. However, those who do tend to hire the applicants from
the university requiring the exam.

4.

Are employers willing to help fund the exam if it may result in
more qualified job applicants?
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- A small percentage o f employers contacted mentioned that if the
exam improves the quality o f education obtained by graduates they
would consider assisting UNO in funding the exam.

166

Appendix L
Searchable Information for Sam's Problem
1. Occupation information
A. Information specific to Sam's company?
1.

What are the injury data of the company?
- Sam's company has approximately 7-10 back injury reports and 5
shoulder injury reports per year. Most o f these incidents are not
serious injuries.

2.

How many employees work for Sam's company?
- Sam's company employs 75 pest control technicians.

3.

How many complaints does the company receive about safety?
- The company processes approximately 30 safety complaints per
year.

4.

Does Sam's company have a safety policy?
- The company's safety policy states that they will train new
employees on how to safely use the equipment. This releases the
company from responsibility for injuries resulting from misuse of
equipment. The policy will pay for injuries resulting from the
correct use of the equipment.

5.

Is Sam's company competitive with others?
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- Sam's company is one of the leading pest control organizations in
their area.
B. General occupational information
1.

How does Sam's company compare to other pest control companies
in terms of injury statistics?
- Sam's company is right around the occupational average in terms
of number of injuries.

2.

How does Sam's company relate to other pest control companies in
terms of salary?
- On average, the employees in Sam's company make more than
the occupational average because their pay is based on
commission.

3.

Have any ergonomic studies been done in this area?
- No ergonomic studies have been done that specifically involved
pest-control equipment.

4.

What is the status o f the local economy?
- The local economy has been depressed for the past year and no
relief is seen for the near future.

C. Information about spot jobs.
1.

How soon would he start the spot j ob?
- The spot job would begin in a week.
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2.

How long would the spot job last?
- The spot job would last for three days.

3.

What is the occurrence of spot j obs?
- Spot jobs are usually quite common. However, due the depressed
economy, they have been very scarce over the past year. Most
people are attempting to do their own pest control rather than
paying a technician.

4.

What exactly is a spot job?
- A spot job is a job that results from a call for a pest technician
from someone who is not a regular customer of Sam's company.
They are usually "one time" jobs that a company or individual
needs completed.

5.

Why would the spot job be more dangerous than other jobs?
- This spot job is to fumigate a large, old, four-story warehouse
building. This will involve lugging the equipment up stairs and
ladders, etc., to get at all parts of the building (it is too old to be
equipped with elevators and has very high ceilings).

D. Information about similar jobs.
1.

Are there other jobs available in a similar area?
- Sam cannot think o f any jobs that are similar to pest control.

2.

Are there part-time jobs available in other fields?
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- Due to the depressed economy, part-time jobs are very scarce.
3.

Are there full-time jobs available in other fields?
- Due to the depressed economy, full-time jobs are very scarce.

4.

What is Sam qualified to do?
- Pest control is the only job Sam has ever had and the only thing
he feels he is qualified to do because he only has a high school
education.

2. Financial information
A. Money information
1.

What are Sam's additional expenses?
- Sam's family has incurred many unforeseen family related
expenses over the past few months (funerals, legal bills, medical
bills, etc).

2.

When will Sam get paid if he does the spot job?
- Sam gets paid half o f the money up-front and the other half when
the job is finished.

3.

Does Sam have any savings or way o f borrowing money to make
payments?
- Sam has used his savings and has been unable to get a loan
because he has no collateral.

B. Compensation/insurance information
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1.

Does Sam's company offer workman’s compensation?
- Sam's company provides workman's compensation if an
employee gets hurts while correctly performing his/her job.

2.

Does Sam have medical insurance?
- Sam has medical insurance, but to keep monthly payments low,
he chose an option with a very high deductible, which he has not
yet met.

3.

Does Sam have disability insurance?
- Sam's company offers disability insurance as a part o f a flexible
benefits plan. Sam did not choose to receive it.

3. Specific job information
A. Can Sam get help with the job?
1.

Will Sam's company pay to get him help with the extra equipment?
- Sam's company will not pay for extra help because they would
then need to pay two people to do a job which they hired only one
person to do.

2.

Could Sam hire extra help?
- It would be too expensive for Sam to hire someone to help him.

3.

Would wearing a back brace help?
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- Sam does not feel that spending money on a back brace is
practical or cost effective because he has so many other bills and
his back is currently fine,

4.

Can Sam get help from a friend?
- Sam does not have any friends who have the time to assist him on
his job with no pay, and Sam does not have money to pay them.

5.

Can Sam get an apprentice?
- Getting an apprentice would require either money from him or his
company, neither of which is possible.

B. What has the company done to help prevent injuries?
1.

Does the company have a safety coordinator?
- The company does not have a safety coordinator on staff.

2.

Specifically, what has the company done to prevent injuries?
- The company trains all new employees on the proper ways to lift
and maneuver the equipment.

3.

Can salary pay be used instead of commission without supervision
if the injury rate is high so employees do not feel they have to
work as fast?
- Employees feel that they make more under a commission pay
system because they have more control over how much work they
perform.
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4.

Has Sam investigated unions involving his trade to try and improve
safety on the job?
- Sam is a union member. However, Sam does not feel the union
can help because he is very satisfied with the pay, and the
equipment they use is the top of the line. It just happens to be very
heavy to lift and move around.

5.

Can Sam's company attempt to develop new, lighter equipment?
- Sam's company does not have a research and development
department.

C. Information on equipment and ways of doing the job
1.

Is there lighter equipment that his employer could be convinced to
use?
- There is no lighter equipment available on the market that the
company can purchase.

2.

Are there different, less strenuous ways to use the present
equipment?
- Employees are trained on the best and lest strenuous ways to use
the equipment.

3.

Can he wheel the equipment around in a cart?
- Carts are not practical for pest control technicians because most
areas they need to get to are not accessible with a cart.
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4.

Is there any way he could break or divide some o f the equipment
up to make lighter loads?
- The equipment cannot be divided because it all needs to be
together to function.

5.

What would he actually be maneuvering around?
- Sam would be carrying and maneuvering a large pest control unit
that can fumigate and spray different types o f pest control
substances.

4. Information about Sam
A. Personal information regarding Sam
1.

How diligently did Sam search for another job?
- Sam watches the classified ads in the paper, but is not diligently
looking for another job because pest control is all he feels qualified
to do.

2.

How many hours a day does Sam work?
- Sam usually works around 8 hours a day for his regular
customers. Any spot jobs he does are either above and beyond this
time or on weekends.

3.

Is Sam ignoring safety rules to increase income?
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- Sam will occasionally lift incorrectly in order to move the
equipment more quickly, but for the most part he follows the safety
guidelines.
4.

What is Sam's age?
- Sam is 42 years old.

B. Information about Sam's family
1.

Is Sam married?
- Sam is married.

2.

How many kids does Sam have?
- Sam has three kids.

3.

Can his children help with financial constraints?
- Sam's kids are too young to work.

4.

Could Sam's family cut down on living expenses?
- Sam cannot see how they can cut living expenses any more than
they already have.

C. Information about Sam's health
1.

Does Sam try to stay in good physical condition?
- Sam is very healthy and physically fit. He works out each
morning before going to work.

2.

Does Sam have a drug history?
- Sam does not have a drug history.
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3.

Has Sam ever been off o f work from pain resulting from work?
- Sam has never missed work because o f a work-related injury.

4.

Does Sam have any work-related physical problems presently?
- Sam occasionally has backaches after work, but other than that he
is in good health.
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Appendix M
Appropriateness Rating Scale

An appropriate solution is one that is (a) pragmatic, (b) socially responsible, and (c)
ethical.

1.

Solution does not meet any of the three criteria OR seriously violates one
or more of the three criteria

2.

Solution meets only one of the three criteria

3.

Solution meets only two of the three criteria

4.

Solution meets all three of the criteria
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Appendix N
Originality Rating Scale
The degree to which the solution is not structured by the problem presented and goes
beyond it. The degree of novelty and uniqueness of the solution.
A solution is structured by the problem if
1. It is implied by the problem
2. No new elements are introduced in it
A solution is not structured by the problem if
1. Shows thinking outside o f the box
2. Not being pulled into the frame o f the problem
3. Something new is added to the solution
4. Solution shows that person is questioning the premise or assumption of
the problem
Give a rating o f 1-3 if solution is structured by the problem and a rating o f 4-6 if solution
is not structured by the problem.
1.

Solution structured by the problem. Very common response.

2.

Solution structured by the problem. Somewhat common response.

3.

Solution structured by the problem. Uncommon response.

4.

Solution not structured by the problem. Common response.

5.

Solution not structured by the problem. Uncommon response.

6.

Solution not structured by the problem. Very uncommon response.
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Appendix O
Arousal Scale
Using the following words, please indicate how you felt when working on the problem
presented on the computer. Using the five point scale given below and starting with
number 30 on the computer answer sheet, indicate how accurately each word describes
how you felt.

Does not describe

Accurately describes

how I felt

how I felt

30. Active

31. Energetic

32. Lively

33. Sharp

34. Drowsy

35. Sluggish

36. Jumpy

37. Exhilarated

.38. Tired

39. Alert

40. Anxious

41. Aroused

42. Peppy

43. Jittery

44. Inactive

45. Relaxed

46. Calm

47. Agitated

48. Bored
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Appendix P
Description of Study Read to Participants
(UNO has recently asked us to assist them in collecting information on a problem
or dilemma currently being discussed by campus administrators). This study is being
conducted as a way to collect possible solutions to a problem. You will read a problem,
have the chance to look at additional information about the problem, provide a solution to
the problem, and answer a few questionnaires. (Your solution to this problem will be
combined with others and will be considered by UNO administrators when they attempt
to develop a resolution to the problem).

Before providing a solution to the problem you will be presented with, you will
have the option to look at additional information that has been collected on the problem
but is not provided by the problem itself. The information is provided so that you can
produce an informed solution to the problem based on the information you feel is
important.

By using this computer, you will only have to look at the information you feel you
need to provide an educated solution to the problem. You will be given command buttons
with numbers and letters similar to this one (point to the screen). Just follow the
commands to the information you want to see. If you forget parts of the problem, click on
"view problem" button and the computer will show you the problem again. Once you
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have looked at all the information you desire, click on the "solve problem" button. You
will be asked to type your solution directly into the computer. Remember, you only need
to look at the information you feel will benefit you in providing a solution to the problem.
If you have any questions about the computer or anything else while you are working,
please ask me, I will be outside the room. Thank you for your participation in this effort.

Note. Words in parentheses were read only to the participants in the outcomeinvolvement condition.
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Appendix Q
Debriefing Statement
The experiment you just finished was a study on the effects o f involvement on
problem solving. You were told of the academic problem in an effort to increase your
involvement in the problem. We are predicted that people who are more involved in a
problem will be more effective in solving the problem. UNO does NOT have an
academic problem. The issue was construed by the experimenter. If you would like more
information about the experiment, or about the results once obtained, please contact Jody
lilies (phone number). Thank you for your participation in this research. Remember on
your way out to obtain a research exposure points card from the experimenter to get credit
for your participation. In an effort to obtain unbiased results, please do not discuss this
experiments with other people who might be possible future participants.

Thank you again for your participation.

